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On Health, Law, and Religion
Stacey A. Tovino, J.D., Ph.D.*
Abstract
The Supreme Court recently decided a number of cases
involving health, law, and religion, including Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt, Zubik v. Burwell, and Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. These cases were important for understanding
constitutional undue burden limitations and the boundaries of
religious
exercise
during
the
Obama
Administration.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent opinions addressing
health, law, and religion have little value for many health law
professors and most practicing health care attorneys. These
individuals, tasked with teaching and applying the thousands of
federal and state statutes, regulations, and government guidance
documents that address a wide variety of health care access,
quality, liability, organization, and finance issues, do not deal with
constitutional undue burden limitations and the boundaries of
religious exercise on a regular basis. Instead, these individuals
focus on practical legal questions raised by the day-to-day delivery
of health care.
This Article seeks to remedy the lack of judicial and academic
attention to practical issues that lie at the intersection of health,
law, and religion. Drawing guidance from fields as wide ranging
as constitutional law, transportation law, utilities law, criminal
law, contract law, tax law, and trusts and estates law, this Article
proposes new federal regulations and agency guidance in four
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illustrative contexts that implicate health, law, and religion. These
contexts include religious nonmedical health care, home health
care, hospice care, and health information confidentiality. If
adopted by the federal Department of Health and Human Services,
the proposals set forth in this Article will improve the counsel
provided by regulatory health care attorneys as well as the public’s
understanding of issues that lie at the intersection of health, law,
and religion.
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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court recently decided a number of cases
involving health, law, and religion. In Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 1 a group of abortion providers challenged a Texas law
requiring physicians who perform abortions to maintain admitting
privileges at a local hospital as well as a second provision requiring
abortion facilities to meet requirements applicable to surgery
centers. 2 On June 27, 2016, the Court ruled that each provision
constituted an undue burden on abortion access in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 3
In Zubik v. Burwell, 4 by further example, a group of nonprofit
organizations that provide health insurance to their employees
challenged federal regulations requiring, as an exception to a
1.
2.
3.
4.

136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
Id. at 2296.
Id. at 2300.
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).

ON HEALTH, LAW, AND RELIGION

1625

contraception coverage mandate, submission of a religious
objection form to the government.5 The petitioners alleged that the
requirement to submit the form substantially burdened their
exercise of religion 6 in violation of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). 7 On May 16, 2016, the Court remanded
the case, asking the parties to craft an approach that
accommodated petitioners’ religious exercise and that ensured
contraception coverage for women employees.8
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,9 by final example,
three closely held corporations challenged federal regulations
requiring them to provide health insurance coverage of their
employees’ contraception. 10 Because the owners of the corporations
sincerely believed that life begins at conception, they objected to
birth control that could destroy such life. 11 On June 30, 2014, the
Court ruled that the contraceptive coverage mandate substantially
burdened the corporation owners’ exercise of religion in violation
of RFRA. 12
5. See id. at 1559 (“Petitioners allege that submitting this notice
substantially burdens the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . .”); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) (2016) (stating
that a health plan complies with the Affordable Care Act’s contraception coverage
requirement when it provides a copy of a self-certification to each health
insurance issuer or a notice to the federal Department of Health and Human
Services objecting to coverage of contraceptive services on religious grounds); 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(b)–(c) (2015) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(b)–(c)
(2016) (same). See generally Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013) (“After meeting a
self-certification standard . . . nonprofit religious organizations that qualify for
these accommodations are not required to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for
contraceptive coverage.”).
6. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1559.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012) (prohibiting the government from
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability).
8. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
9. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10. See id. at 2754 (“Nonexempt employers are generally required to provide
coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug
Administration . . . .”).
11. See id. at 2759 (“In these cases, the owners of three closely held for-profit
corporations have sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at conception and that
it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices
that operate after that point.”).
12. See id. at 2759 (“We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation
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The petitioners in Whole Woman’s Health, Zubik, and Hobby
Lobby were successful in part because they were politically
motivated13 and in part because they were threatened by
large-scale clinical and financial losses. 14 Without the ruling in
Whole Woman’s Health, tens of thousands of Texas women would
have lost access to safe abortions 15 and abortion clinics would have
spent millions of dollars on surgery center compliance. 16 Likewise,
the employers in Zubik and Hobby Lobby would have had to
violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action
that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes
the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”).
13. See, e.g., Advocacy, WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, https://wholewomans
health.com/about-us/advocacy/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Whole Woman’s
Health remains a strong advocate and community pillar wherever we have clinics,
becoming the voice of women’s reproductive justice . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Eli Clifton, Hobby Lobby’s Secret Agenda: How
It’s Quietly Funding a Vast Right-Wing Movement, SALON (Mar. 27, 2014, 11:45
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/03/27/hobby_lobbys_secret_agenda_how_its_
secretly_funding_a_vast_right_wing_movement/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017)
[Hobby Lobby provides] funding for a group that backs a political
network of activist groups deeply engaged in pushing a Christian
agenda into American law . . . . [E]ntities related to [Hobby Lobby are]
two of the largest donors to the organization funding a right-wing
Christian agenda, investing tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars
into a vast network of organizations . . . . That network of activist
groups has succeeded in passing legislation in Arizona requiring
women to undergo an ultrasound before an abortion, banning
taxpayer-funded insurance paying for government employees’
abortions, defining marriage as a union between a man and woman,
and funding abstinence education.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text (referencing these
large-scale clinical and financial losses).
15. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Texas’ Big Lie, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2016, 7:23 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/whole_w
oman_s_health_v_hellerstedt_is_a_test_for_the_supreme_court_can_the.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“[T]here is virtually no doubt that closing clinics en
masse will lead to terrible health outcomes for Texas women . . . . Tens of
thousands of women across the state will thus lose access to clinics. They will not
have safer, cleaner clinics. They will simply have none.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318
(2016) (“[T]he costs that a currently licensed abortion facility would have to incur
to meet the surgical-center requirements were considerable, ranging from $1
million per facility (for facilities with adequate space) to $3 million per facility
(where additional land must be purchased).”).
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provide contraception coverage to thousands of employees in
violation of their religious beliefs or pay millions of dollars per year
in taxes and penalties without Supreme Court rulings in their
favor.17
The opinions in Whole Woman’s Health, Zubik, and Hobby
Lobby were important for understanding constitutional undue
burden limitations and the boundaries of religious exercise when
President Obama was in office. 18 How constitutional undue burden
limitations, including those articulated in Whole Woman’s Health,
will fare during the Trump Administration remains to be seen.
Given the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, 19
further restrictions on women’s reproductive rights are expected. 20
17. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–65
(2014) (noting that petitioner Conestoga Wood Specialties has 950 employees,
petitioner Hobby Lobby has 13,000 employees, and petitioner Mardel has 400
employees; describing the companies’ Christian values and religious beliefs); id.
at 2775–76 (calculating the millions of dollars of taxes and penalties that
Conestoga Wood Specialties, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel would owe if they failed
to provide insurance coverage of contraception or if they stopped providing health
insurance coverage altogether).
18. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Strikes Down Abortion
Restrictions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/supreme-court-texasabortion.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (discussing the importance of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Binyamin Appelbaum, What the Hobby Lobby
Ruling
Means
for
America,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/what-the-hobby-lobby-rulingmeans-for-america.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (discussing the significance
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
19. See Lisa Mascaro & David G. Savage, Senate Confirms Neil Gorsuch,
Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:10 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-gorsuch-confirmed-20170407story.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (reporting the Senate’s confirmation of
Gorsuch) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See, e.g., id. (“[Gorsuch] will restore a narrow conservative majority on
issues such as campaign funding, religious liberty and support for gun ownership
rights. The new justice is expected to join his conservative colleagues in upholding
further restrictions on abortion.”); see also Adam Liptak, What the Trump
Presidency Means for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trump-supreme-court.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“The election of Donald J. Trump means that Justice
Antonin Scalia’s seat, vacant since he died in February, will almost certainly be
filled by a conservative nominee. Back to full strength, the court will again tilt
right, as it has for decades.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

1628

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1623 (2017)

Regardless of Gorsuch’s ideology and the Supreme Court’s
restored conservative tilt, the Supreme Court’s recent opinions
addressing health, law, and religion have little value for many
pure health law professors and many practicing health care
attorneys. These individuals, tasked with teaching and applying
the thousands of federal and state statutes, regulations, and
government guidance documents that address a wide variety of
health care access, 21 quality,22 liability, 23 organization, 24 and
finance 25 issues, do not deal with constitutional undue burden
limitations and the boundaries of religious exercise on a regular
basis.
As an illustration, I have been practicing, teaching, and
writing in a number of heavily regulated areas of health law,
including Medicare-participating hospital operations, 26 general
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, 27 Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement of inpatient and outpatient mental health
services, 28 Medicare and Medicaid financing of graduate medical
21. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012) (codifying the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, which governs access to Medicare
participating hospitals’ emergency departments, including medical screening
examinations, necessary stabilizing treatments, and appropriate transfers).
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–52 (codifying the federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, which promotes professional review activities designed
to improve the quality of health care).
23. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 74.001–74.507 (2016) (codifying
the Texas Medical Liability Act, which governs health care liability claims in the
State of Texas).
24. See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 162.001–162.003 (2016) (governing the
organization of nonprofit health corporations in the State of Texas).
25. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 422.270–422.27495 (2017) (governing the
Nevada Medicaid and the Nevada Children’s Health Insurance Program, two
public health care programs that finance health care for Nevada adults and
children with low income and low resources).
26. See Stacey A. Tovino, Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion: Resisting
Legislative Solution, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 511, 566–71 (2007) (proposing
changes to Medicare regulations governing the use of restraint and seclusion in
the hospital setting).
27. See Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and Specific
Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 AM. J.L. & MED.
471, 514–15 (2012) (proposing to improve the essential health benefits required
by the Affordable Care Act).
28. See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming
Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 45–50 (2012)
(proposing to improve health insurance coverage of mental illness).
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education, 29 and Medicare and Medicaid health care fraud and
abuse,30 for the past two decades. During my law practice and now
in my law teaching, I have witnessed firsthand the multiple ways
in which religion intersects the daily practice and teaching of
health law, yet I rarely find case law that addresses these
intersections. The issues in which I am interested tend not to be
litigated because they do not threaten patients or providers with
large scale clinical or financial losses and do not otherwise draw
significant political attention.
The day-to-day issues that lie at the intersection of health,
law, and religion also receive scant attention from legal scholars.
Many law professors who write about the role of religion in health
care specialize in constitutional law or law and religion. These
scholars focus almost exclusively on Supreme Court decisions such
as Whole Woman’s Health, Zubik, and Hobby Lobby, as well as
related hot topics, including religious liberty, 31 religious
accommodation,32 conscientious objection, 33 sexual orientation

29. See Stacey A. Tovino, I Need a Doctor: A Critique of Government
Financing of Graduate Medical Education, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2431, 2491–
09 (2014) (proposing to improve Medicare financing of graduate medical
education).
30. See Stacey A. Tovino, Incorporating Literature into a Health Law
Curriculum, 9 J. MED. & L. 213, 245–47 (2005) (discussing methods of teaching
the law governing public health care program fraud and abuse using literature).
31. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty, Health Care, and the Culture
Wars, in LAW, RELIGION AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez
Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017) [hereinafter LAW, RELIGION
& HEALTH] (reviewing the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell cases,
assessing alleged conflicts between religious liberty and health care, and
considering appropriate limits on religious exemptions in the health care context).
32. See Agenda, Harvard Law Petrie-Flom Center, 2015 Annual Conference:
Law,
Religion,
and
Health
in
America
(May
8–9,
2015),
https://bsl.app.box.com/s/w1drs6pglz8ez6xx3b19ix6fspnzxh14.pdf
[hereinafter
Harvard Law, Religion, and Health Conference] (discussing the topic of religious
accommodations).
33. See id. at 3 (addressing conscience objections).
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counseling, 34 reproductive decision-making, 35 and brain death. 36
Perhaps because not all of these scholars are familiar with the
American health care delivery system and the federal and state
laws that govern it,37 the intersection of religion with this system
receives little academic attention, leaving many pure health law
professors and most practicing health care attorneys with much
confusion and little guidance when religion intersects their daily
work.
This Article seeks to remedy this problem. That is, this Article
identifies four illustrative ways in which religion intersects the
daily practice of health law, including issues that courts have not
carefully addressed and legal academics have not thoroughly
examined in traditional law review scholarship. 38 Drawing
guidance from fields as wide ranging as constitutional law,
34. See Craig Konnoth, Reclaiming Biopolitics: Religion and Psychiatry in
the Sexual Orientation Change Therapy Cases and the Establishment Clause
Defense, in LAW, RELIGION & HEALTH, supra note 31 (exploring the pedigree of
therapies that undergird sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) and showing
that SOCE is best understood as a form of religious ministry); see also Susan
Stable, Religious Convictions About Homosexuality and the Training of
Counseling Professionals: How Should We Treat Religious-Based Opposition to
Counseling About Same-Sex Relationship? in LAW, RELIGION & HEALTH, supra
note 31 (arguing that the religious convictions of those who wish to enter the
counseling professions can be respected while still safeguarding the interest of
individuals seeking same-sex counseling).
35. See B. Jessie Hill, Regulating Reasons: Government Regulation of Private
Deliberation in Reproductive Decision-Making, in LAW, RELIGION & HEALTH,
supra note 31 (considering the legal and constitutional significance of religious
motivations in private decision-making in the context of reproductive health
care); see also I. Glenn Cohen, Religion and Reproductive Technology, in LAW,
RELIGION & HEALTH, supra note 31 (examining four particular intersections of
religion and reproductive technology); see also Dov Fox, Religion and the Unborn
Under the First Amendment, in LAW, RELIGION & HEALTH, supra note 31 (arguing
that certain challenges to the Establishment Clause trade on a misunderstanding
of religion and its relationship to ideas about the unborn).
36. See Thaddeus Pope, Brain Death Rejected: Expanding Legal Duties to
Accommodate Religious Objections, in LAW, RELIGION & HEALTH, supra note 31
(arguing that all states should require hospitals to accommodate families with
religious objections to determination of death by neurological criteria).
37. Both federal and state laws govern the health care industry and the
health care delivery system. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. Parts 2-1008 (2016) (federal
regulations governing Medicare-participating health care providers and
suppliers); see also NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. 449 (2016) (state statutes governing
medical facilities in Nevada).
38. Infra Parts II–V.
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transportation law, utilities law, criminal law, contract law, tax
law, and trusts and wills law, this Article proposes three sets of
federal regulations and three guidance documents designed to
advise and inform practicing health care attorneys, pure health
law professors, and the general public. 39 This Article also calls on
constitutional law and law and religion scholars to bring their
significant expertise to bear on the practical yet important
questions raised herein. 40 This Article concludes by making three
administrative recommendations that, if implemented by the
federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), would
improve the counsel provided by regulatory health care attorneys
as well as the public’s understanding of issues that lie at the
intersection of health, law, and religion. 41
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the law
governing religious nonmedical health care institutions (RNHCIs),
which are nonprofit, tax-exempt religious organizations that
furnish only nonmedical health care items and services to patients
who elect to rely solely upon religious methods of healing.42 Part II
illustrates the mixing of religious and non-religious care provided
by RNHCIs and reviews the Supreme Court case law and federal
regulations that govern direct federal financing of health and
social services. 43 Part II applies this legal authority to Medicare
coverage of RNHCIs and proposes amendments to 42 C.F.R.
§§ 403.720 and 403.766 as well as guidance that would clarify
outstanding issues for practicing health care attorneys and the
general public. 44
Part III explores the intersection of religion and home health
care law.45 Home health care includes a wide range of health care
39. Infra Parts II–V.
40. Infra Parts II–V.
41. Infra Part VI.
42. See 42 C.F.R. § 403.702 (defining religious nonmedical care); see also
Religious Nonmedical Health Care Institutions, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/Certification
andComplianc/RNHCIs.html (last updated Apr. 10, 2013) (last visited Sept. 20,
2017) [hereinafter CMS Summary of RNHCIs] (describing religious nonmedical
health care institutions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. Infra Part II.
44. Infra Part II.
45. Infra Part III.
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services that providers can safely deliver to patients who are
confined to their homes. 46 As one might expect, Medicare prohibits
home health agencies from seeking reimbursement for home
health services provided to beneficiaries who are not actually
confined to their homes.47 Although HHS’s Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) has stated that beneficiaries who
leave the home for short periods of time for religious services still
may be considered confined to their homes,48 practicing attorneys
frequently confront cases in which beneficiaries may be using
attendance at religious services as a cover, as well as cases in
which beneficiaries participate in choir practice, prayer groups
outside of church, church-sponsored meals, church bus trips, and
church bazaars but still wish to be considered confined to the
home. Part III explores the proper division of religious services and
other activities for purposes of Medicare coverage of home health
care and proposes content for two new regulatory definitions that
would be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 484.2 as well as complementary
CMS guidance defining religious services. 49
Part IV examines the intersection of spirituality and hospice
law.50 Hospice is a program of palliative care and support, but not
treatment or cure, for individuals with terminal illness. 51
Medicare-participating hospice programs are required by federal
law to assess and meet the spiritual needs of hospice patients and
their family members.52 Practicing health care attorneys who have
little or no training in religious or spiritual studies frequently work
on cases in which the hospice patient, his or her family, or CMS
following a complaint from the family alleges that the hospice did
46. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., CMS PROD. NO. 10969, MEDICARE AND HOME HEALTH CARE 4–5 (rev’d May
2010) (describing home health care and defining the homebound requirement).
47. See id. at 5 (“If you have Medicare, you can use your home health benefits
if: . . . [y]ou’re homebound, and a doctor certifies that you’re homebound.”).
48. See id. (“[A person] may leave home for medical treatment or short,
infrequent absences for non-medical reasons, like attending religious services.”).
49. Infra Part III.
50. Infra Part IV.
51. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., CMS PROD. NO. 02154, MEDICARE HOSPICE BENEFITS 4 (rev’d Feb. 2016)
(defining hospice).
52. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.54 (2016) (requiring an assessment of spiritual
needs).
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not identify—and therefore did not meet—the patient’s or family’s
spiritual needs, frequently because they were not recognized by
hospice workers as such. 53 Part IV explores a variety of legal and
industry understandings of spirituality and proposes that HHS
issue a guidance document offering a framework for spirituality
and explaining if, when, and in which contexts certain needs would
qualify as spiritual needs. 54
Part V examines the intersection of religion and the law
governing health information confidentiality. 55 The federal HIPAA
Privacy Rule, for example, carefully distinguishes health care
providers from religious and spiritual care providers, 56 even
though many hospitals and other health care institutions consider
chaplains an important part of the health care team.57 Attorneys
with expertise in health information confidentiality are frequently
asked to mediate this conflict, with mixed results. 58 Part V
proposes important amendments to 45 C.F.R. § 164.501, including
a new definition of “health care chaplain” and amendments to the
definition of “health care operations” that would include the
religious, spiritual, and other services provided by hospital
chaplains. 59
After identifying additional, illustrative issues that lie at the
intersection of health, law, and religion, this Article concludes by
making three procedural recommendations. If implemented, these
recommendations would improve the counsel provided by
regulatory health care attorneys as well as the public’s

53. Infra Part IV.
54. Infra Part IV.
55. Infra Part V.
56. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,568 (Dec. 28, 2000) (“‘[H]ealth care’ as
defined under the rule does not include methods of healing that are solely
spiritual. Therefore, clergy or other religious practitioners that provide solely
religious healing services are not health care providers within the meaning of this
rule.”).
57. See, e.g., Your Health Care Team, CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH SYS.,
http://www.christianacare.org/yourhealthcareteam (last visited Sept. 20, 2017)
(discussing the inclusion of staff chaplains within the health care team) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. Infra Part V.
59. Infra Part V.
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understanding of issues that lie at the intersection of health, law,
and religion. 60
II. Religious Nonmedical Health Care
A good portion of health law is designed to identify which
individuals and institutions constitute health care providers and
suppliers that are eligible to receive Medicare, Medicaid, or other
federal health care program reimbursement in exchange for
providing health-related services and supplies to government
beneficiaries. 61 Physicians and hospitals obviously can qualify, but
a range of other health care institutions, including religious
organizations, also may be eligible depending on the
circumstances.
For example, certain RNHCIs are considered health care
providers under federal law and are eligible to receive Medicare
reimbursement for certain health-related services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries. 62 RNHCIs are nonprofit, tax-exempt
60. Infra Part VI.
61. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.1 (2016) (defining “provider of services” to include
hospitals, critical access hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing facilities,
home health agencies, hospices, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation
facilities, and providers of outpatient physical therapy and speech pathology
services); id. § 489.2 (defining “provider” to include the following entities if they
have an agreement to participate in Medicare: hospitals, transplant centers,
critical access hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, comprehensive outpatient
rehabilitation facilities, home health agencies, hospices, religious nonmedical
health care institutions); id. § 488.1 (defining “supplier” to include providers of
independent laboratory services, portable x-ray services, physical therapists in
independent practice, end-stage renal disease facilities, rural health clinics,
federally qualified health centers, chiropractors, and ambulatory surgical
centers); id. § 489.2 (providing “supplier” entities participating in Medicare
including: independent laboratories, durable medical equipment suppliers,
ambulance service providers, independent diagnostic testing facilities,
physicians, physician assistants, physical therapists in independent practice,
suppliers of portable x-ray services, rural health clinics, federally qualified health
centers, ambulatory surgical centers and certain end-stage renal disease
facilities); id. § 488.30 (defining “provider of services, provider, or supplier” to
include ambulatory surgical centers, transplant centers, and religious
non-medical health care institutions).
62. See id. § 498.2 (defining “provider” to include RNHCIs); see also
id. § 403.752 (addressing Medicare payment for RNHCI services). RNHCIs also
may be eligible to receive Medicaid payments under a State Plan option. See
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Religious Nonmedical Health Care
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religious organizations that furnish only nonmedical health care
items and services to patients who elect to rely solely upon
religious methods of healing 63 and for whom the acceptance of
medical health services would be inconsistent with their religious
beliefs. 64 RNHCIs include, but are not limited to, Christian Science
sanatoria.65

Institutions and Advance Directives, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,710, 66,710 (Nov. 28, 2003)
(discussing amendments to federal law governing RNHCIs under Medicare and
as a State Plan option under Medicaid). For ease of analysis, this Article will limit
its discussion to Medicare coverage of RNHCIs.
63. Federal regulations define “religious nonmedical care” and “religious
method of healing” as “health care furnished under established religious tenets
that prohibit conventional or unconventional medical care for the treatment of a
beneficiary, and the sole reliance on these religious tenets to fulfill a beneficiary’s
total health care needs.” 42 C.F.R. § 403.702.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-5 (2012) (establishing the statutory basis for
Medicare payments to RNHCIs); 42 C.F.R. § 440.170(b)(1)–(10) (describing the
characteristics of RNHCIs); id. §§ 403.700–403.770 (establishing the Medicare
conditions of participation for RNHCIs); id. § 403.702 (defining “election” as a
written statement signed by the beneficiary indicating the beneficiary’s choice to
receive nonmedical care or treatment for religious reasons). Medicare recognizes
RNHCIs as providers but uses different terminology with respect to RHNCIs
compared to other health care providers. For example, Medicare-participating
hospitals
are
required
to
maintain “medical
records,”
whereas
Medicare-participating RHNCIs are required to maintain “patient records.” See
42 C.F.R. § 489.102(a)(2) (requiring most Medicare-participating health care
providers to document whether or not an individual has an advance directive in
the patient’s medical record while requiring RNHCIs to document such
information in the patient care record).
65. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Religious Nonmedical Health
Care Institutions and Advance Directives, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,028, 67,028 (Nov. 30,
1999) (“While the previous [rules] were specific to Christian Science sanatoria,
the new amendments make it possible for institutions other than Christian
Science facilities to qualify as RNHCIs and to participate in Medicare and
Medicaid.”); see also Kong v. Min de Parle, No. C 00–4285 CRB, 2001 WL 1464549,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2001) (“Congress intended the statute to be sect-neutral.
Congress explicitly stated that the exemption is intended to provide ‘a
sect-neutral accommodation to any person . . . for whom the acceptance of medical
health services would be inconsistent with his or her religious beliefs.’” (citations
omitted)).
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Although Medicare does not pay for the religious aspects of
beneficiaries’ RNHCI care, 66 Medicare Part A 67 will cover
66. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, STATE OPERATIONS
MANUAL, APPDX. U, SURVEY PROCEDURES AND INTERPRETIVE GUIDELINES FOR
RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEDICARE PARTICIPATING RELIGIOUS NONMEDICAL
HEALTHCARE INSTITUTIONS 3 (May 21, 2004), https://www.cms.gov/Regulationsand-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/som107ap_u_rnhci.pdf [hereinafter
State Operations Manual Provisions] (“Note: Religious components of the healing
are not covered.”); id. at 11 (“The religious aspects of care are the financial
responsibility of the patient.”); see also Religious Non-Medical Health Care Institution
(RNHCI) Items & Services, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/rnhciitems-and-services.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Medicare doesn't cover the
religious portion of RNCHI care.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM, PUB. 100-02 MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY, REVISIONS
TO INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTRACTORS OTHER THAN THE RELIGIOUS NONMEDICAL
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTION (RNHCI) SPECIALTY CONTRACTOR REGARDING CLAIMS
FOR BENEFICIARIES WITH RNHCI ELECTIONS, at 8 (2006) [hereinafter Transmittal
45] (“As in the original RNHCI benefit, Medicare will only pay for nonmedical
services in the home, but not for those religious items or services provided by the
RNHCI.”).
67. Medicare is a public healthcare program that, in 1966, began providing
health insurance to individuals age 65 or older who were insured under the
federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program. See Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §101, 79 Stat. 286 (stating the purpose
behind the Hospital Insurance Act of 1965). The Social Security Amendments of
1972 expanded Medicare eligibility to include certain individuals under the age
of 65 who had disabilities and certain individuals with end-stage renal disease.
See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299I 86 Stat. 1329
(expanding Medicare eligibility). At the time of the Social Security Amendments
of 1965 and 1972, Medicare coverage consisted only of hospital insurance (i.e.,
Medicare Part A) as well as supplemental medical insurance (i.e., Medicare Part
B). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c–i-5 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (codifying “[Medicare] Part
A—Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”); id. §§ 1395j–1395w-5
(codifying “[Medicare] Part B—Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits for
Aged and Disabled”). In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress added a third
part to the Medicare Program (Medicare Part C). Originally named Medicare
Choice, this part provided Medicare beneficiaries with managed care options. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21–w-28. In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), Congress changed the compensation and
business practices for insurers offering Medicare Choice plans, renaming the part
Medicare Advantage (MA). Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 201–238, 117 Stat. 2066. The
MMA also added a fourth part to the Medicare Program (Medicare Part D), which
provided a prescription drug benefit that subsidized the costs of prescription
drugs and prescription drug insurance premiums for Medicare beneficiaries. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101–w-154 (“A reduction in the annual deductible, a
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nonreligious, nonmedical health care provided to RNHCI
beneficiaries, including inpatient care in an RNHCI, as well as
intermittent nursing care 68 and durable medical equipment
(DME) 69 provided to beneficiaries in their homes, when certain
conditions are satisfied. 70 The federal legislation authorizing
Medicare payments to RNHCIs has survived constitutional
challenges by taxpayers and other stakeholders who have argued
that the legislation should be subject to strict scrutiny and that the
legislation impermissibly establishes religion in violation of the
First Amendment. 71 Constitutional law scholars who have written
about RNHCIs have focused on the general questions raised by
these constitutional challenges; that is, whether the RNHCI
legislation should be subject to strict scrutiny and whether
Medicare funding of RNHCIs impermissibly establishes religion. 72
reduction in the coinsurance percentage, or an increase in the initial coverage
limit with respect to covered part D drugs . . . .”).
68. Intermittent nursing care eligible for Medicare coverage includes
assistance with the activities of daily living, assistance in moving, turning,
positioning, ambulation, nutritional assistance, and the provision of comfort and
support measures. See 64 Fed. Reg. 67,028, 67,030 (Nov. 30, 1999) (“Furnishes
nonmedical items and services exclusively through nonmedical nursing personnel
who are experienced in caring for the physical needs of these patients.”).
69. DME eligible for Medicare coverage include canes, crutches, walkers,
commodes, a standard wheelchair, hospital beds, bedpans, and urinals. See
Transmittal 45, supra note 66, at 9 (listing examples of reimbursable durable
medical equipment).
70. For example, the RNHCI must be a certified Medicare-participating
provider and the RNHCI utilization review committee must agree that the patient
would require hospital or skilled nursing facility care but for the patient’s
religious beliefs. See CMS Summary of RNHCIs, supra note 42 (“Furnishes
nonmedical items and services to inpatients on a 24-hour basis.”); see also 42
C.F.R. §§ 403.764–403.766 (2017) (governing Medicare payment for home health
services provided by RNHCIs).
71. See, e.g., Kong v. Scully, 341 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]axing
for health care and providing it to its citizens, an incidental expenditure, less than
1/10 of 1% of the amount annually expended, in order to accommodate . . . the
religious beliefs of a minority is not . . . an establishment of religion.”); see also
Children’s Healthcare v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2000)
(holding that strict scrutiny review does not apply to RNHCI legislation and that
federal law authorizing Medicare payments to RNHCIs is a permissible
accommodation of religion).
72. Some scholars agree with the case law upholding the federal statutes and
regulations that govern RNHCIs. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious
Organizational Freedom and Conditions on Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 165, 190 (2009) (“The Eighth Circuit was correct in upholding the
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Scholars, practicing attorneys, and current and former members of
the Christian Science Church have opposing viewpoints on these
issues. 73
Neither the enabling legislation, 74 nor the implementing
regulations, 75 nor the State Operations Manual, 76 nor legal
scholarship distinguishes religious and non-religious care. Only
the implementing regulations even touch on the subject, stating
accommodations in the funding program. Whether or not the government is
required to preserve religious organizations’ choice in the funding context, it
should at least be permitted to do so.” (citation omitted)). Others disagree. See,
e.g., Breanna R. Harris, Note, Veiled in Textual Neutrality: Is That Enough? A
Candid Reexamination of the Constitutionality of Section 4454 of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, 61 ALA. L. REV. 393, 394 (2010) (addressing “the magnitude
of this issue (for example, hundreds of millions of Medicare and Medicaid dollars
are spent annually and program funds are quickly evaporating, putting millions
of American citizens at risk of depleting health care resources)” and calling for
“government action to remedy this violation”).
73. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 72, at 167 (making the case that “religious
organizations ought to be able to challenge . . . conditions that exclude them from
benefits because of their religious character or a practice important to the
organization’s religious identity”); see also Harris, supra note 72, at 394
(disagreeing with court decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 4454
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997); CBS, 60 MINUTES By Faith Alone,
YOUTUBE (July 26, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQ2hfRbXUq8 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (highlighting the difference of opinion held by many in and
around the Christian Science Church regarding Medicare payments to RNHCIs,
including Sen. Orrin Hatch, attorney Bob Bruno, outside counsel to the Christian
Science Church Michael McConnell, and former Church member Leslie Saunders)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jarred Booth, Christian
Science Health Care Scam Part 3: Medicare and Medicaid Have Been Paying Out
Millions Each Year to Christian Science Non-Medical Facilities, NEWS HUB (May
15, 2016, 9:58 AM), https://bsl.app.box.com/s/xp1zutqjfkoi4h6idiflx1zma3i8afbf
(last updated July 31, 2016) (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Whether the Christian
Science leaders are sincere in their beliefs or not is completely irrelevant . . . . The
fact that they [won’t remove spiritual healing from the Church], while continuing
to rake in the millions from the government, convinces me that, yes, Christian
Science healing is a scam.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 105th Cong. § 4454
(titled “Coverage of services in religious nonmedical health care institutions
under the Medicare and Medicaid programs”).
75. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 403.700–403.770 (2017) (“Subpart G—Religious
Nonmedical Health Care Institutions—Benefits, Conditions of Participation, and
Payment.”).
76. See State Operations Manual Provisions, supra note 66, at 3, 11 (stating
that Medicare does not cover the religious aspects and the religious components
of care without discussing what constitutes a religious aspect or component of
care).
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that care provided by religious practitioners is not eligible for
Medicare reimbursement. 77 These primary and secondary
authorities also do not address a question that practicing
health-care attorneys frequently receive from disgruntled
taxpayers, hospital associations, general medical associations,
medical specialty associations, organizations that oppose medical
neglect of children, and other stakeholders: whether RNHCIs may
provide religious and non-religious care to Medicare beneficiaries
at the same time and in the same location without violating the
Establishment Clause.
The question is common given the well-known body of legal
authority prohibiting the mixing of religious services with
programs receiving direct federal financial assistance.78 President
Obama’s Executive Order 13279 (Order), for example, requires
faith-based organizations to perform their religious activities
“outside of programs that are supported with direct [f]ederal
financial assistance” and to conduct them “separately in time or
location from any such programs or services supported with direct
[f]ederal financial assistance.” 79 The Order also requires “explicitly
religious activities” to be voluntary for beneficiaries of programs
that receive direct federal financial assistance. 80
The separation and voluntariness requirements are codified in
federal regulations as well. For example, HHS regulations prohibit
organizations that receive direct financial assistance from HHS
from engaging in “inherently religious activities, such as worship,
religious instruction, or proselytization, as part of the programs or
services funded with direct financial assistance from [HHS].” 81
These regulations further require organizations to conduct any
inherently religious activities “separately, in time or location, from
the programs or services funded with direct financial assistance
77. See 64 Fed. Reg. 67,028, 67,029 (Nov. 30, 1999) (“[The regulations] do not
mention the use of a religious practitioner since we consider the cost of using a
religious practitioner the financial responsibility of the patient.”).
78. See infra notes 79–91 and accompanying text (providing examples of both
Congress and the Executive branch attempting to enforce a separation between
religion and federal funds).
79. See Exec. Order No. 13279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141, 77,142 (Dec. 16, 2002)
(outlining fundamental principles and policymaking criteria for partnerships
with faith-based and other neighborhood organizations).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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from [HHS],” and to make participation in such activities
voluntary for the beneficiaries of the federally funded services. 82
Regulations promulgated by other federal agencies such as the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA), 83 the Veterans Administration (VA), 84 the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 85 and the Department
of Agriculture (USDA), 86 contain the same rules and prohibitions.
Historically, there has been disagreement regarding the
degree of separation required between programming receiving
direct federal financial assistance and religious activities. 87 In a
2010 report by President Obama’s Advisory Council on
Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships (Council), for
example, Council members disagreed regarding whether the
government should allow subsidized social services to be provided
in rooms that contain religious art, scripture, messages, or
symbols.88 A majority of Council members believed that the
government should neither require nor encourage the removal of
religious art, scripture, messages, or symbols in rooms where
82. Id.
83. See 42 C.F.R. § 54a.4 (2017) (“No funds provided directly from
SAHMSA . . . may be expended for inherently religious activities . . . . If an
organization conducts such activities, it must offer them separately, in time or
location, from the programs or services for which it receives funds directly from
SAMHSA . . . .”).
84. See 38 C.F.R. § 62.62(c) (“Organizations that engage in inherently
religious activities, such as worship, religious instruction, or proselytization,
must offer those services separately in time or location from any programs or
services funded with direct financial assistance from VA under this part . . . .”).
85. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.109(c) (mirroring the language of the SAMHSA and VA
regulations set forth at supra notes 83 and 84).
86. See Policy Memorandum No. FD–138 from Laura Castro, Dir., USDA
Food Distribution Div., on Written Notice and Referral Requirements for
Beneficiaries Receiving TEFAP & CSFP Benefits from Religious Organizations
(June 10, 2016) (“Because TEFAP is supported in whole or in part by financial
assistance from the Federal Government, we are required to let you know
that . . . we must separate in time or location any privately funded explicitly
religious activities from activities supported with USDA direct assistance . . . .”).
87. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (explicating the
disagreement).
88. See PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FAITH-BASED AND NEIGHBORHOOD
P’SHIPS, A NEW ERA OF PARTNERSHIPS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT 132 (2010) [hereinafter COUNCIL REPORT] (detailing the views of the
various factions among the Council).
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funded services are provided. 89 A minority of Council members
believed that federally funded programming should only take place
in rooms with religious items if removing such items would be
infeasible and no space without such items existed. 90 Two Council
members believed that the government should amend federal law
to permit nongovernmental organizations to offer federally funded
programming only in areas devoid of religious items. 91
Given this body of law and the historical disagreement
regarding its interpretation, practicing health care attorneys are
frequently asked by stakeholders to further challenge the
constitutionality of Medicare coverage of RNHCI care. The
requested challenge is that RNHCI care involves the simultaneous
provision—many times in the same room and sometimes at the
same time of day—of Medicare-reimbursed health care and
religious care, including spiritual healing prayers, Bible readings,
and hymn singing,92 by Christian Science nurses 93 and Christian
Science practitioners. 94
89. See id. (noting that sixteen Council members held this view).
90. See id. at 132–33 (noting that seven Council members held this view).
91. See id. at 133 (stating that these two Council members specifically
“believe the Administration should amend existing regulations, guidance, and an
executive order to permit nongovernmental organizations to offer federally
funded programming only in areas devoid of such items”).
92. See Christian Science Sanatoriums (LL-6000.1500), INFO. AND REFERRAL
FEDERATION L.A. COUNTY, https://211taxonomy.org/search/record?code=LL6000.1500 (last updated Nov. 4, 2009) (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (defining
Christian Science Sanitoriums [sic]: “Christian Science nursing facilities that
treat people who are ill with prayer instead of traditional medicine. In place of
the drugs, surgery and therapy . . . sick church members receive care that
includes praying, Bible reading and hymn singing”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
93. See Christian Science Nursing, CHRISTIAN SCI., http://www.
christianscience.com/member-resources/christian-science-nursing (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (noting that Christian Science nursing care includes “[r]eading to
or with an individual from the Bible, Science and Health with Key to the
Scriptures and other writings by Mary Baker Eddy, and additional literature
published by The Christian Science Publishing Society . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. See Christian Science Practitioners, CHRISTIAN SCI., http://www.christian
science.com/member-resources/christian-science-practitioners (last visited Sept.
20, 2017) (noting that Christian Science practitioners’ scope of services include
providing requested prayer and visiting the person who is requesting prayer) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also RITA SWAN, THE LAST
STRAWBERRY 7–40 (2010) (describing Rita and Doug Swan’s use of Christian
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Specific examples of this simultaneous, or mixed, RNHCI care
may be helpful before proceeding. In Christian Science nursing
homes, which are a type of RNHCI facility, broadcasts of Sunday
services and Wednesday testimony meetings from the First
Church of Christ, Science, are played through the RNHCI’s public
address (PA) system while beneficiaries may be receiving
Medicare-covered services such as wound cleansing and
bandaging, assistance with positioning and ambulation, assistance
with nutrition, and provision of comfort and support measures. 95
Christian Science nursing homes also require all guests, including
Medicare beneficiaries, to “[a]ctively study and practice Christian
Science.” 96 Christian Science nursing homes further allow all
guests, including Medicare beneficiaries, to request prayer, 97
spiritual encouragement, and reading aloud from a Christian
Science practitioner. 98 The required study and requested prayer
Science practitioners for the care of their fifteen-month-old son, Matthew, who
died on July 7, 1977 of untreated meningitis).
95. See 64 Fed. Reg. 67,028–030 (Nov. 30, 1999) (listing RNHCI services
covered by Medicare); see also Inpatient/Outpatient Care, CHESTNUT HILL
BENEVOLENT ASS’N,
http://www.chbenevolent.org/christian-science-nursing/
inpatient-care-outpatient-care (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Each room receives
the Christian Science textbook, hymns and a variety of Christian Science
broadcasts on our PA system . . . . Informal church services are held Sunday
afternoons and Thursday evenings in our activity room.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Christian Science Nursing Care, ARDEN WOOD,
http://ardenwood.org/christian-science-nursing-care/services-accommodations/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Patients are cared for in private rooms . . . . Audio
broadcasts of Christian Science hymns, the weekly Bible Lesson and Science and
Health with Key to the Scriptures as well as live Sunday and Wednesday church
services are available in each room.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Activities, FERN LODGE, http://fernlodge.org/admissions/activities/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (referencing the Church Services as well as a television
station that makes such services available to guests who do not leave their rooms)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See, e.g., MORNING LIGHT VISITING CHRISTIAN SCIENCE NURSING SERVICE,
AGREEMENT FOR CHRISTIAN SCIENCE NURSING CARE, INCLUDING YOUR RIGHTS AS A
PATIENT 1, http://morninglightcs.org/docs/MLF_Visiting_Nurse_Agreement.pdf
[hereinafter MORNING LIGHT] (stating the pledge that patients of this facility must
make).
97. See Booth, supra note 73 (“Prayer by a Christian Science practitioner is
very different from what Christians normally think of as prayer. It is not
intercessory prayer, petitioning God for healing. Rather, it is mental argument
against the false belief that is affecting the patient.”).
98. See MORNING LIGHT, supra note 96 (offering “spiritual encouragement”
and “reading aloud”).
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can and does take place in the same facility and many times in the
same room where Medicare-covered care is provided. 99
In theory, it might seem that an RNHCI facility could deliver
its religious and nonreligious services separately.100 When
teaching Medicare coverage of RNHCIs, I am frequently asked
whether RNHCI beneficiaries can receive their nonreligious
services in their private rooms and their religious services in
separate prayer or reading rooms, perhaps because the Council
and the courts have suggested that such separation can occur. 101
Although some beneficiaries’ physical and metaphysical care could
be separated, other beneficiaries’ acute, near-death conditions
cause them to be confined to their beds. These latter patients do,
as a practical and clinical matter, receive both types of care while
they lie in their beds. 102
99. See Christian Science Nursing, CHRISTIAN SCI., http://www.Christian
science.com/member-resources/christian-science-nursing (last visited Sept. 20,
2017) (“Christian Science nursing facilities or houses provide a sanctuary where
an individual’s desire to rely solely on prayer for healing is upheld by the spiritual
reassurance and practical care given by Christian Science nurses. These
organizations offer 24-hour skilled Christian Science nursing care.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. See Children’s Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min de Parle, 212 F.3d
1084, 1098 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[N]othing in [the Balanced Budget Act] suggests that
these physical care services cannot be separated from the prayer and other
religious activities that may occur within RNHCIs.”); see also id. at 1100 (“[T]he
physical services provided by Christian Science sanitoria are distinct and
separable from any religious activity that may take place within such facilities.”).
101. See, e.g., COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 149–51 (demonstrating how
religion-based abstinence education programs can be completely separated in
time and location from federally funded programming, including by “eliminat[ing]
all religious materials from the presentation of the federally funded abstinence
education program,” which includes rings with religious messages and bibles); see
also Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc., 212 F.3d at 1098–1100
(suggesting that religious services can be separated from Medicare-funded
services in RNHCIs).
102. See supra note 73 (referencing a “60 Minutes” episode that discussed a
woman dying of breast cancer in an RNHCI; noting that the RNHCI’s PA system,
which plays Christian Science broadcasts, was turned up while the woman was
screaming in pain); see also Christian Science Nursing Care, ARDEN WOOD,
http://ardenwood.org/christian-science-nursing-care/services-accommodations/
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (stating that “[f]or every patient, our nurses perform
the following tasks: . . . . Cleanse and bandage wounds . . . . Read aloud the Bible
Lesson and other authorized Christian Science literature”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Christian Science Nursing Service at Sunrise
Haven, SUNRISE HAVEN, http://www.sunrisehaven.org/web/cs-nursing-care/
nursing-services (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (summarizing the 24-hour Christian
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The mixing of religious and non-religious care occurs in the
outpatient RNHCI context too. Homebound RNHCI beneficiaries
may be living in a small home or apartment and may receive their
Medicare-covered intermittent nursing services, use their
Medicare-covered DME items such as wheelchairs and hospital
beds, and receive their religious care all in the same room. 103
RNHCI nurses, trained to provide both physical and metaphysical
care, do not leave the beneficiaries’ homes between the provision
of nursing and religious care so as to separate in time the
Medicare-covered services and the non-covered religious
services. 104
Given the unique way in which RNHCI care is delivered, many
stakeholders, including practicing health care attorneys who are
asked to represent such stakeholders, are perplexed regarding how
it is that RNHCI legislation authorizing Medicare payment of
RNHCI care remains constitutional. The catch, which usually only
scholars and practitioners of constitutional law understand, is that
the regulatory prohibitions against mixing religious services with
non-religious programming only apply to organizations that
receive
direct
federal
financial
assistance.
Although
Medicare-participating RNHCIs certainly receive federal financial
assistance, 105 that assistance likely would be considered indirect—
Science nursing care available to guests) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Sunrise Haven Skilled Nursing Home Kent Washington, INNOMOM,
http://www.senior-care-resources.com/directory/listing/sunrise-haven-skilled-nursinghome-kent-washington/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Our services
include . . . [P]ersonal care, bandaging, and bed care, as needed . . . . Your day
might include working with the Christian Science study books, periodicals, and
audiotapes; being read to by a staff member or volunteer; and other activities,
such as musical events, a movie, or a scenic ride . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See Transmittal 45, supra note 66, at 11 (explaining that Medicare covers
the costs of nursing care provided to RNHCI beneficiaries in the home, that such
care is provided by nursing personnel who are “skilled in ministering to a
beneficiary’s religious needs” as well as supporting the beneficiary’s activities of
daily living).
104. See, e.g., COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 149 (suggesting that
separation of a religious and a federally funded program may be accomplished by
having “sufficient time between the two programs to vacate the room . . . [and]
completely dismiss the participants of the first program” before the second set of
participants enter the room).
105. See Frazier v. Bd. of Trs. Of Nw. Miss. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 765 F.2d 1278,
1288–89 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a county hospital that received Medicare
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i.e., the result of private choice—if analyzed under current
Supreme Court authority.
The Establishment Clause commands that there shall be “no
law respecting an establishment of religion.” 106 The evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection
include “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity.” 107 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 108 the
Supreme Court stated a three-part test for assessing sect-neutral
legislation 109 challenged under the Establishment Clause; that is,
whether the legislation: (1) has a secular legislative purpose;
(2) has a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. 110 The Supreme Court has struggled
to apply this test 111 and has acknowledged that it can only “dimly
perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in this
sensitive area.”112
and Medicaid payments was a recipient of federal financial assistance); What
Qualifies as Federal Financial Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/faqs/what-qualifiesas-federal-financial-assistance/301/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017)
(stating that hospitals and nursing homes that receive Medicare Part A payments
receive federal financial assistance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
107. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. Id. at 612; see also Kong v. Min de Parle, No. C 00-4285 CRB, 2001 WL
1464549, *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2001) (“Congress intended the statute
[authorizing RNHCIs] to be sect-neutral. Congress explicitly stated that the
exemption is intended to provide ‘a sect-neutral accommodation to any
person . . . for whom the acceptance of medical health services would be
inconsistent with his or her religious beliefs.’” (citations omitted)), aff’d sub nom.
Kong v. Scully, 341 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g denied, 357 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.
2004) (amending opinion).
110. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (articulating a three-part test for
determining Establishment Clause violations).
111. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) (“[W]e have consistently
struggled to apply these simple words in the context of governmental aid to
religious schools.”).
112. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (“And, as we have
noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v. DiCenso, candor compels the
acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible
government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.”)
(citations omitted).
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The question whether governmental aid results in
governmental indoctrination turns on the question whether any
religious indoctrination that occurs could reasonably be attributed
to governmental action.113 Here, the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms 114 is instructive. 115 In Mitchell, the Court
examined Chapter 2 of Title I of the (since-reauthorized)
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),
pursuant to which the federal government distributes funds to
state and local governmental agencies, which in turn lend
educational materials and equipment to public and private schools
based on how many students are enrolled in those schools. 116 At
the time of this litigation, in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana,
approximately thirty percent of ESEA funds went to private
schools, mostly Catholic and other religious schools, because
approximately thirty percent of Jefferson Parish students enrolled
in private schools. 117 The question before the Court was whether
ESEA violated the Establishment Clause as applied in Jefferson
Parish. 118
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable
to the government and indoctrination that is not, the Court in
Mitchell explained that neutrality is key: “If the religious,
irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental
aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
government.” 119 To assess neutrality in cases in which federal
funds assist religious institutions, the Court asks whether such

113. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (asking whether the
presence of a sign-language interpreter at a Catholic school could be attributed to
state decision making).
114. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
115. See id. at 801–03 (discussing whether funding secular educational
materials in religious schools violates the Establishment Clause).
116. Id. at 801.
117. See id. at 803 (“It appears that, in an average year, about 30% of Chapter
2 funds spent in Jefferson Parish are allocated for private schools.”).
118. See id. at 801 (“The question is whether Chapter 2, as applied in
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, is a law respecting an establishment of religion,
because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in that parish are
religiously affiliated.”).
119. Id. at 809.
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funding is a result of the “genuinely independent and private
choices of individuals.” 120
In Mitchell, Justice Clarence Thomas (with three Justices
concurring and two Justices concurring in the judgment) held that
because federal ESEA funds were neutrally available to all schools,
public and private, and before reaching the religious schools
“passe[d] through the hands, literally or figuratively, of numerous
private citizens who [we]re free to direct the aid elsewhere” by
enrolling in public or private schools of their choice, ESEA did not
support religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. 121
This analysis is useful in considering Medicare payments to
RNHCIs. As with the students in Mitchell, Medicare beneficiaries
make their own private choice to seek medical care at a
nonreligious medical facility such as a traditional hospital or, if
they elect to rely solely upon religious methods of healing due to
their religion, nonmedical care at an RNHCI. Medicare
reimbursement follows the beneficiary’s private choice regarding
the type of facility from which he or she seeks care, not the other
way around. In summary, Medicare coverage of nonreligious,
nonmedical care at an RNHCI, even when mixed with religious
care, should survive constitutional and regulatory challenge under
current law. 122
The catch is that most practicing health care attorneys do not
have the background in constitutional law to conduct this level of
analysis quickly and efficiently. Indeed, President Obama’s
Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships
found that, “The distinction between direct and indirect financial
assistance ‘has great practical significance, but it is not generally
well understood except among religious freedom specialists.’” 123
120. Id. at 810 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226).
121. Id. at 795, 815.
122. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 87.1(c)(1) (2017)
Federal financial assistance provided to an organization is considered
indirect when: (i) The Government program through which the
beneficiary receives the voucher, certificate, or other similar means of
Government-funded payment is neutral toward religion; (ii) The
organization receives the assistance as a result of a decision of the
beneficiary, not a decision of the government; and (iii) The beneficiary
has at least one adequate secular option for the use of the voucher,
certificate, or other similar means of Government-funded payment.
123. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 133.

1648

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1623 (2017)

Although the Executive Order and the federal regulations that
reference the prohibition against mixing religious services with
funded, nonreligious programming 124 are easily findable on the
Internet by taxpayers, hospital associations, medical associations,
medical specialty groups, and other stakeholders who search for
ways to challenge Medicare coverage of RNHCIs, the proper
interpretation of these prohibitions is not readily available or
accessible for individuals without expertise in religious freedom. 125
I have three recommendations for correcting this problem.
First, HHS should issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
that would propose to add a new sub-paragraph (f) to 42 C.F.R.
§ 403.720, as illustrated by the language set forth below. This new
sub-paragraph would provide regulatory guidance for attorneys
who are asked to represent inpatient RNHCI facilities and
attorneys who are asked to represent disgruntled taxpayers and
other stakeholders who wish to challenge Medicare payment to
inpatient RNHCI facilities.
42 C.F.R. § 403.720—Conditions of Coverage
Medicare covers services furnished in an RNHCI if the following
conditions are met:
...
(f) To the extent otherwise permitted by Federal law, the
restrictions on inherently religious activities set forth at 45
C.F.R. Part 87 do not apply where Medicare Part A funds are
provided to RNHCIs as a result of a genuine and independent
private choice of a beneficiary, provided the RNHCI otherwise
satisfies the conditions of payment set forth in this Part. An
124. Supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text.
125. See COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 134 (“Members of the Council
nonetheless agree that it would be beneficial if the Administration—not the
Council—stated clearly its operative understanding of the existing law [regarding
the distinction between direct and indirect federal financial assistance],
especially in ways accessible to non-legal and otherwise broader audiences.”); id.
(“The Council also believes that it would have practical value to make this
distinction and its consequences better known and understood by Federal
employees, service providers and beneficiaries. That additional measure of clarity
would promote better communication and collaboration, and correspondingly
reduce confusion and potential litigation.”); id. (“For example, if service providers
are told clearly which existing programs involve direct and which involve indirect
aid, providers that are unwilling to separate religious and secular components of
their programming are likelier to self-select out of direct aid programs.”).
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RNHCI receives Medicare Part A funds as the result of a
beneficiary’s genuine and independent choice if the beneficiary
is voluntarily and conscientiously opposed to the acceptance of
nonexcepted medical treatment, the beneficiary voluntarily and
independently acknowledges that the acceptance of
nonexcepted medical treatment is inconsistent with his or her
sincere religious beliefs, the beneficiary has a genuine and
independent choice among religious and nonreligious health
care providers, and the beneficiary voluntarily and
independently elects to receive care in an RNHCI facility.

In the preamble to the NPRM, HHS should solicit commentary on
this language not only from regulatory health care attorneys but
also from scholars of constitutional law and law and religion. HHS
should use the commentary it receives to adjust the final
regulatory language.
Second, in the same NPRM, HHS should propose to add a new
sub-paragraph (f) to 42 C.F.R. § 403.766, as illustrated by the
language set forth below. This new sub-paragraph would provide
regulatory guidance to attorneys and stakeholders in litigation
involving providers and suppliers of home health services and
DME items when such services are provided to RNHCI
beneficiaries in their homes.
42 C.F.R. 403.766—Requirements for Coverage and Payment of
RNHCI Home Services
...
(f) To the extent otherwise permitted by Federal law, the
restrictions on inherently religious activities set forth at 45
C.F.R. Part 87 do not apply where Medicare Part A funds cover
home services and DME items provided to RNHCI beneficiaries
in their homes as a result of a genuine and independent private
choice of a beneficiary, provided the other conditions of payment
set forth in this Part are satisfied. A beneficiary exercises a
genuine and independent private choice if the beneficiary is
voluntarily and conscientiously opposed to the acceptance of
nonexcepted medical treatment, the beneficiary voluntarily and
independently acknowledges that the acceptance of
nonexcepted medical treatment is inconsistent with his or her
sincere religious beliefs, the beneficiary has a genuine and
independent choice among medical and religious home health
and DME service providers, and the beneficiary voluntarily and
independently selects RNHCI home health and DME services.
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Again, HHS should solicit commentary not only from regulatory
health care attorneys but also from scholars of constitutional law
and law and religion. HHS should use the commentary it receives
to adjust the final regulatory language.
Third, I propose that HHS issue a guidance document titled
“Religious Nonmedical Health Care Institutions and the
Establishment Clause,” clarifying that under Supreme Court case
law and federal regulations, Medicare coverage of RNHCI care is
considered indirect financial support due to Medicare beneficiaries’
private choice in selecting among medical and religious facilities.
The guidance document should further clarify that in cases
involving indirect financial support, the prohibitions against
separating religious services from funded, nonreligious
programming do not apply. Finally, the guidance document should
clarify that RNHCI care, by definition, involves the provision of
religious and nonreligious care at the same location—either the
RNHCI facility or the home depending on whether the beneficiary
is using his or her inpatient or home health benefits—and
sometimes at the same time of day. However, Medicare is only
paying for nonreligious services, not religious services, and the cost
of using a religious practitioner is a personal financial
responsibility of the beneficiary.
In terms of format and accessibility, this guidance should be
modeled on existing HHS guidance documents that are readily
available on the Internet and that provide clear answers on other
complex health law topics such as the regulation of human subjects
research, 126 HIPAA Privacy,127 and health care fraud and abuse. 128
126. See Office for Human Research Protections, Guidance, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“OHRP has published a variety of guidance documents to
assist the research community in conducting ethical research that is in
compliance with the HHS regulations. On this page, OHRP guidance documents
are organized in categories that should be intuitive for members of the research
community.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
127. See Health Information Privacy, Guidance on Significant Aspects of the
Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/guidance/significant-aspects/index.html (last visited Sept.
20, 2017) (providing sixteen guidance documents on a range of HIPAA Privacy
topics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. See Office of Inspector General, Compliance Guidance, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/index.asp
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (developing a series of voluntary compliance program
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III. Home Health Care
Part II addressed the intersection of religion and the law
governing Medicare payment of RNHCI care. 129 Religion intersects
Medicare payment law in other ways as well. For example,
Medicare will cover medically necessary home health services,
called home health care, provided to Medicare beneficiaries who
are confined to their homes.130 CMS considers a beneficiary to be
confined to the home if leaving the home is medically
contraindicated or if the beneficiary needs the aid of a supportive
device such as a wheelchair, walker, or special transportation in
order to leave the home.131 A Medicare beneficiary who frequently
leaves the home, or who leaves the home for long periods of time,
even if only infrequent, is not considered confined to the home and
is not eligible for home health services. 132 Indeed, home health
agencies that bill for such services may be engaging in federal
health care fraud and abuse and may be subject to stringent civil
and criminal penalties. 133
During my practice, I frequently represented home health
agencies that billed Medicare for home health services provided to
beneficiaries who left the home on a weekly basis to attend
religious services and also had a lunch or dinner or other social
activity (or series of activities) outside the home preceding or
following such services. In these cases, the legal question was
guidance documents directed at various segments of the health care industry,
such as hospitals, nursing homes, third-party billers, and durable medical
equipment suppliers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See supra Part II (discussing whether the RNHCI legislation should be
subject to strict scrutiny).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2)(A) (2012) (providing home health services
coverage).
131. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., CMS MANUAL SYSTEM, PUB. 100-02 MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY,
TRANSMITTAL 192, at 5 (2014) [hereinafter CMS HOME HEALTH GUIDANCE].
Additional criteria must be met in order for a Medicare beneficiary to be
considered confined to the home. See id. (providing detail regarding the
requirements for a Medicare recipient to be considered confined to the home).
132. See id. (providing exemptions only for absences that are “infrequent or of
relatively short duration”).
133. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B) (identifying the submission of false
claims or false records to the government as grounds for civil liability under the
federal False Claims Act).
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whether the beneficiary was actually confined to the home. CMS
has stated that beneficiaries who leave the home for short periods
of time for religious services still may be considered confined to the
home,134 although healthy beneficiaries who use attendance at
religious services as a cover or who otherwise abuse this provision
certainly may be treated differently.
The dividing line between religious services and other pre- and
post-religious service activities is not always clear. For example,
many places of worship offer religious- and non-religious music,
food, and other activities immediately before or after formal
services at a church, temple, mosque, or other place of worship. As
an illustration, a Lutheran church may hold choir practice
immediately before a religious service; a Catholic church may offer
a seven-fish dinner following Christmas Eve mass; a Catholic
church may hold a baptism, first penance, first communion,
confirmation, wedding, or funeral before or after a regular
religious service or at a separate time during the week; or any
place of worship may hold a day- or week-long religious retreat.
Taking it further, many places of worship sponsor annual,
semi-annual, or monthly bazaars, bake sales, and bus trips for
their parishioners. Whether a Medicare home health beneficiary
who wishes to participate in one or more of these activities should
still be considered confined to his or her home is a question that
has not been carefully addressed by the courts or by legal
academics. 135
This issue came up several times in my law practice when a
home health beneficiary or family member would tell a home
health aide or the beneficiary’s attending physician that the
134. See CMS HOME HEALTH GUIDANCE, supra note 131, at 60.4.1 (stating,
“[a]ny absence for the purpose of attending a religious service shall be deemed to
be an absence of infrequent or short duration”); see also CMS MANUAL SYSTEM,
PUB 100-02, MEDICARE BENEFIT POLICY, TRANSMITTAL 172, CHANGE REQUEST 8444,
Oct. 18, 2013, at 7 (“[A]ny absence for the purpose of attending a religious service
shall be deemed to be an absence of infrequent or short duration.”). See generally
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE BASICS 27 (2011) (discussing Medicare coverage of home health
services).
135. See, e.g., Russell v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 386, 391 (D. Vt. 2010)
(discussing whether an individual who left the home once or twice a month to go
grocery shopping and to Big Lots, but not to religious services, was confined to
the home for purposes of qualifying as a Medicare home health beneficiary).
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beneficiary would be attending, or already had attended, some type
of activity, or series of activities, before or after attending a formal
religious service at a place of worship. The aide or physician would
typically respond by reminding the beneficiary that Medicare
requires the beneficiary to be confined to the home in order to
receive reimbursed home health care services. In turn, the family
member would tell the aide or physician that the beneficiary has a
legal right to practice his or her religion and that a complaint to
the media, a lawyer, or CMS would follow if the beneficiary could
not participate in the requested “religious” activity.
This threat would place my client in a difficult position. Most
home health agencies, home health aides, and referring physicians
do not want to open the door to a complaint or a lawsuit, especially
not a religion-based complaint or lawsuit, so they may immediately
drop the issue even though they suspect or know that the
beneficiary is not really confined to his or her home. However, most
providers also know that they can risk stringent civil and criminal
penalties for submitting false claims to Medicare and otherwise
committing health care fraud, including the certification of a
beneficiary as homebound when there is evidence to the
contrary. 136 I was frequently asked to navigate my home health
136. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (b)(1) (2012) (imposing federal False
Claims Act liability on any person who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent
claim for payment to the government or who knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval); id. (defining
knowingly to include situations in which a person has actual knowledge of the
information as well as situations in which a person acts in deliberate ignorance
or in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information); see also U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-04-11-00240,
INAPPROPRIATE AND QUESTIONABLE BILLING BY MEDICARE HOME HEALTH AGENCIES
2–3, 7, 33 (Aug. 2012) (defining homebound, stating that a physician or other
approved provider must visit a beneficiary at his or her home and make a
determination that the beneficiary is homebound and that home health services
are medically necessary before ordering home health services for the beneficiary);
id. (noting additionally that federal False Claims Act liability can be imposed on
non-compliant home health agencies); North Richland Hills Physician Admits
Role in Health Care Fraud Conspiracy, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (June 16, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/north-richland-hills-physician-admits-rolehealth-care-fraud-conspiracy (reporting that a physician signed orders for home
health care on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries who were not homebound or
qualified for Medicare-covered home health care services; the physician faces a
maximum statutory penalty of five years in federal prison, a $250,000 fine, and
may be ordered to pay restitution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). See generally National Medicare Fraud Takedown Results in Charges
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agency clients through this rock and hard place. However, there is
no relevant CMS or academic guidance addressing which activities
are considered religious services and which are not. 137
A few cases illustrate industry understandings of the phrase
“religious services,” although the courts in many of these cases
have reserved passing on these definitions. In State ex rel. North
Carolina Utilities Commission v. McKinnon, 138 for example, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina examined whether defendant
Safety Transit Company (Safety) violated the state’s Bus Act of
1949 (Bus Act). 139 Safety believed it had the authority to
transport religious groups to “religious services” without
obtaining prior approval from the North Carolina Utilities
Commission (Commission) under a Bus Act exemption. 140
In an earlier order to Safety, the Commission had defined the
phrase “religious services” somewhat circularly as “religious
services or ‘divine services’ . . . [but not] church picnics, church
recreational meetings or other outings to lakes and beaches
sponsored by churches or Sunday schools . . . [and not]
collateral or auxiliary meetings sponsored by churches or
Sunday schools but which do not fall within the meaning or
definition of religious services or ‘divine services.’”141
In subsequent litigation, Safety argued that the Commission’s
previous definition of the phrase was too narrow. 142 However,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not address Safety’s
argument because of the lack of an allegation that Safety

Against 243 Individuals for Approximately $712 Million in False Billing, U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE (June 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-healthcare-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-301-individuals-approximately900 (noting that home health fraud was prominent among the types of health care
fraud discovered in a recent federal government investigation) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. Cf. Kevin Lemley, A Proposal to Expand the Religious Services
Exemption under the Copyright Act, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 481, 481
(2012) (“No court has yet interpreted this exemption, and scholars have given it
a similar level of review. As such, an analysis of this exemption’s
constitutionality . . . is an issue that has largely gone unaddressed by both the
judiciary and academic communities.”).
138. 118 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1961).
139. Id. at 139.
140. Id. at 137.
141. Id. at 138–39.
142. Id. at 143.
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violated the provision allowing transportation of groups to
religious services. 143

In criminal cases, courts have interpreted the phrase
“religious service” as synonymous with “divine worship” and
“assembly for religious purposes.” In McDaniel v. State, 144 for
example, the defendant allegedly disturbed a Methodist Episcopal
Church service and was charged with violating a Georgia Penal
Code provision prohibiting the disturbance of a congregation of
persons lawfully assembled for “divine service.” 145 In its jury
charge, the trial court used the word “religious” instead of the word
“divine.” 146 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals overruled an
exception to the word swap reasoning that, “In a broader and
philosophic sense of the word there may be a shade of difference in
meaning between the two expressions, but in popular usage they
are synonymous.”147 The court of appeals further stated that,
“there was nothing harmful or confusing in using the expressions,
‘assembled for religious purposes,’ ‘assembled for divine service,’
and ‘assembled for religious services,’ synonymously and
interchangeably.” 148
Breach of contract cases further suggest that the phrase
“religious services” include the praying, teaching, preaching, and
counseling provided by clergypersons, as well as the performance
of formal services in accordance with the canons of a religious
organization. In Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and Consistory of
Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, et al., 149 for example, the
plaintiff clergyman alleged that the defendant Russian Orthodox
Greek Catholic Church breached its contract to pay the plaintiff
for his performance of religious services. 150 In determining the
religious services allegedly required of the plaintiff, the court
143. Id.
144. 63 S.E. 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).
145. Id. at 920.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 142 Misc. 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932).
150. Id. at 897 (“The claim of the plaintiff is that [of] an agreement in writing
with [defendant] wherein it was mutually agreed that plaintiff should perform
religious services for said association and said mission and they would jointly pay
to plaintiff therefor a sum of ninety dollars per month . . . .”).
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explained, “[r]eligious services of a clergyman may be said to
require him under superior authority to offer prayers and
sacrifices, to teach, preach, and give counsel, and to perform
services and acts in accordance with the beliefs, principles,
doctrines, canons, rules, and regulations of his religious
organization.”151
Statutory income tax exemptions also have used, but not
defined, the phrase “religious service.” Under the Houses of
Worship Free Speech Restoration Act (Act), for example, the
tax-exempt status of a church cannot be terminated due to political
advocacy so long as any political speech stays within the “content,
preparation, or presentation of any homily, sermon, teaching,
dialectic, or other presentation made during religious services or
gatherings.”152 Relying on fourteen factors used by the Internal
Revenue Service to evaluate the legitimacy of an organization
claiming to be a church, one tax law scholar defined “religious
service” for purposes of the Act’s income tax exemption as a
“gathering by a regular congregation at an established place of
worship for the purpose of a regular service.” 153
Counties, school districts, and other governmental entities
also have used the phrase “religious services” in published policies
limiting the use of governmental space for religious services. In
litigation against it, Centennial School District in Warminster,
Pennsylvania, revealed that it had defined religious services to
include the “invocation of, worship to, prayer to, or adoration of a
deity.” 154
The above discussion focused on definitions and
interpretations of “religious services” found in case law. Federal
and state statutes and regulations also may be helpful in providing
meaning to terms used but not defined in the law governing home
health care. Although research revealed no federal regulation
151. Id. at 902.
152. H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
153. Richard J. Wood, Pious Politics: Political Speech Funded through I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) Organizations Examined under Tax Fairness Principles, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 209, 224 (2007).
154. See, e.g., Gregoire et al. v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 103, 104
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that in a policy prohibiting the use of its buildings and
facilities for religious services, defendant Centennial School District defined the
term as “the invocation of, worship to, prayer to, or adoration of a d[ei]ty”).
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defining “religious services,” many state regulations do define the
phrase. California juvenile justice regulations, for example, define
“religious services” as the “regularly scheduled weekly gatherings
of a religious faith group such as Catholicism, Protestantism,
Islamism, Judaism, and Native American.”155 Rhode Island
corrections regulations define the phrase as a “meeting which is
religious in nature and provides an opportunity for worship,
Illinois
fellowship,
or
congregational
participation.” 156
transportation regulations define the phrase as the “coming
together of a group of persons with the same or similar religious
beliefs for the purpose of exercising those beliefs.” 157
Massachusetts corrections regulations define the phrase as a
“[m]eeting which is religious in nature and provides an
opportunity for worship, fellowship, or congregational
participation.” 158
The above cases and regulations set forth a number of
different definitions of “religious services.” 159 At their heart are the
concepts of meeting or gathering, worship, and regularity of
schedule. Although imperfect, a common understanding, or
definition, of “religious services” might be that of “a regularly
scheduled meeting or gathering that is religious in nature and that
provides an opportunity for worship.”
Let us now return to home health law, which allows Medicare
beneficiaries to leave the home for short periods of time for
religious services and still be considered confined to their homes. 160
A beneficiary’s attendance at a regularly scheduled weekly
155. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 4750(a) (2016).
156. R.I. ADMIN. CODE § 17-1-15:III(A)(11) (2016).
157. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1001.610 (2016).
158. 103 MASS. CODE REGS. § 471.05 (2016).
159. See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text (explaining that no
federal regulation defines the phrase “religious services,” but state regulations
do).
160. See CMS HOME HEALTH GUIDANCE, supra note 131, at 60.4.1 (“[A]ny
absence for the purpose of attending a religious service shall be deemed to be an
absence of infrequent or short duration.”); see also CMS Manual System, Pub
100-02, Medicare Benefit Policy, Transmittal 172, Change Request 8444, Oct. 18,
2013 (“[A]ny absence for the purpose of attending a religious service shall be
deemed to be an absence of infrequent or short duration.”). See generally U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE
BASICS 27 (2011) (discussing Medicare coverage of home health services).
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meeting that is religious in nature and provides an opportunity for
worship would meet this exception.
A slightly more difficult question is whether a Medicare
beneficiary who attends a special service such as a baptism, brit
milah, penance, communion, confirmation, bat mitzvah, wedding,
or funeral would still be considered confined to the home. Although
the common law and regulatory definitions offered above do not
expressly include these special services, 161 other regulations
suggest that the answer to this question is “yes.” Arkansas
embalming and funeral regulations, for example, define “funeral
service or funeral” as a “period following death in which there are
religious services or other rites or ceremonies with the body of the
deceased present.” 162 California juvenile justice regulations, by
further example, define “special religious activities” as “activities
other than regularly scheduled religious services and programs
such as epiphanies, baptisms, and religious retreats.”163 Virginia
tax regulations, by final illustrative example, define “religious
worship service” as “regularly scheduled church services and
includes, but is not limited to, weddings, bar mitzvahs, bat
mitzvahs, baptisms, christenings, funerals, and special services
conducted during religious holidays, when conducted at the public
church building.” 164 Although baptisms, communions, weddings,
and the like may be thought of as special, or occasional, religious
services, state law suggests that they should fall within the general
definition of “religious services.”
A final question is whether a Medicare beneficiary who
attends a church- or other place-of-worship-sponsored bake sale,
161. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have stated in an
answer to a frequently-asked question that a Medicare beneficiary’s infrequent
attendance at a funeral of short duration would not cause the beneficiary to lose
homebound status. See Ctrs. Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Frequently Asked
Question 2389, Could You Clarify CMS’ Policy about the Homebound Status of
Home Health Patients Who Can Drive?, https://questions.cms.gov/faq.php?id=
5005&faqId=2389 (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“[I]nfrequent or unique event
would not necessitate a finding that the patient is not homebound if the absences
are . . . infrequent . . . or are . . . relatively short . . . and . . . the patient . . . [does
not have] the capacity to obtain the health care provided outside . . . the home.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
162. ARK. ADMIN. CODE § 043.00.1-I(28) (2016).
163. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 4750(a) (2016).
164. 23 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 10-210-310(A) (2016).
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bazaar, picnic, bus trip, or similar activity, would still be
considered confined to the home. Given that the common thread
among the definitions of religious services was that of a regularly
scheduled meeting that is religious in nature and that provides an
opportunity for worship, these activities may fail due to lack of
frequency or regularity as well as the lack of worship purpose.
Bake sales, bazaars, picnics, and bus trips may not be scheduled
with the same regularity as regular worship services. Even if they
are, their primary purpose may be to raise money or to promote
recreation, leisure, or community, not worship. Indeed, some
agencies, such as the North Carolina Utilities Commission in the
McKinnon case, 165 would expressly exclude “church picnics, church
recreational meetings or other outings to lakes and beaches
sponsored by churches or Sunday schools” as well as “collateral or
auxiliary meetings sponsored by churches or Sunday schools” 166
from the definition of “religious services.”
Although the federal statute authorizing Medicare payment of
home health services to beneficiaries who are confined to the home
is easily findable on the Internet,167 neither the statute nor the
implementing regulations nor any case law nor any HHS guidance
provides a definition of the religious services a beneficiary may
attend without losing homebound status. As with the law
governing RNHCIs, the proper interpretation of this exception is
not readily available or accessible for practicing health care
attorneys and the general public.
One way to correct this problem is for HHS to issue a NPRM
proposing to establish new definitions of the phrases “confined to
the home” and “religious services” applicable to the regulations
governing Medicare payment to home health agencies, as
illustrated by the italicized language set forth below.
42 C.F.R. § 484.2—Definitions.
As used in this part, unless the context indicates otherwise—
165. State ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm’n v. McKinnon, 118 S.E.2d 134, 139 (N.C.
1961).
166. Id. at 138–39.
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012) (“[P]ayment for services furnished
an individual may be made only . . . in the case of home health services, such
services are or were required because the individual is or was confined to his
home . . . .”).
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...
Confined to the home means, with respect to a beneficiary, that
leaving the home is medically contraindicated or that the
beneficiary needs the aid of a supportive device such as a
wheelchair, walker, or special transportation in order to leave
the home. Beneficiaries who leave the home for short periods of
time for religious services may still be considered confined to
the home.
Religious services means a regularly scheduled meeting or
gathering that is religious in nature and that provides an
opportunity for worship. The term includes special religious
services such as baptisms, weddings, and funerals, and other
similar services. The term does not include collateral or
auxiliary meetings or gatherings, such as church-sponsored
bake sales, picnics, and other outings, that are not regularly
scheduled and/or that have as their principal purpose
fundraising, recreation, or leisure.

In the preamble to the NPRM, HHS should solicit commentary
on these definitions not only from regulatory health care attorneys
but also from scholars of constitutional law and law and religion
who are familiar with the different types of regular religious
services and special religious services as well as the boundaries
between these services and auxiliary activities. HHS should use
the commentary it receives to adjust the final regulatory language.
IV. Hospice Care
The focus of this Article thus far has been religion, not
spirituality. 168 I would be remiss if I failed to mention the
168. For wide-ranging discussions of the distinctions between religion and
spirituality by authors with a variety of educational, professional, and
experiential backgrounds, see Paul S. Mueller et al., Religious Involvement,
Spirituality, and Medicine: Implications for Clinical Practice, 76 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 1225, 1225 (2001)
The word religion is from the Latin religare, which means ‘to bind
together.’ A religion organizes the collective spiritual experiences of a
group of people into a system of beliefs and practices. Religious
involvement or religiosity refers to the degree of participation in or
adherence to the beliefs and practices of an organized religion.
Spirituality is from the Latin spiritualitas, which means ‘breath.’ It is
a broader concept than religion and is primarily a dynamic, personal,
and experiential process. Features of spirituality include quest for
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frequency with federal law requires Medicare-participating
providers to assess and respond to the spiritual needs of patients.
The best illustration here is Medicare payment for hospice care.
Hospice is a comprehensive set of services designed to address the
physical, emotional, psychosocial, and spiritual needs of terminally
ill
beneficiaries
and
their
family
members. 169
Medicare-participating hospice programs are required by federal
law to assess and meet the spiritual needs of each terminally ill
meaning and purpose, transcendence . . . connectedness . . . values . . . .
See also Laurel Arthur Burton & Marcia Sue DeWolf Bosek, When Religion May
Be an Ethical Issue, 39 J. RELIGION & HEALTH 97, 98 (2000) (“Perhaps the easiest
distinction is to think of spirituality as a person’s sense of meaning and purpose
in life, or one’s relation to the Cosmos. Religion, on the other hand, can be
understood as organized spirituality that includes doctrines, prescribed rituals,
and governing structures.”); Peter C. Hill, et al., Conceptualizing Religion and
Spirituality: Points of Commonality, Points of Departure, 30 J. THEORY OF SOC.
BEHAV. 51, 52 (2000) (reviewing and analyzing how religion and spirituality have
been conceptualized in the literature); Christopher J. Eberle, Religion and
Insularity: Brian Leiter on Accommodating Religion, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 977,
994 n.56 (2014)
One central difference between religion and spirituality, in my idiolect
at least, is that the latter is individualistic in respects that the former
is not. The radically subjective, individualistic ‘Sheilaism’ made
famous decades ago by Robert Bellah and his collaborators is not really
religion; it is a vague, socially disembodied, and amorphous
spirituality.
Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating Spiritual Perspectives with the Law School
Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 167, 179–80 (2000)
If spirituality is not synonymous with either religion or professional
ethics, how might it be most helpfully defined? Spirituality may be
described in many varied ways. Viewed broadly, it entails a way of
defining and pursuing truth beyond oneself that is more important
than the individual, giving the individual’s actions meaning and
purpose in a larger context.
Calvin G. C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in Law
School Clinic, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 241, 254–55 (1999) (“As stated in my
introduction, spirituality is not religion or religiosity. Unlike spirituality, which
inheres in each person, religion is a framework or system of values and beliefs,
often organized and institutionalized, that serves as a vehicle for spiritual
expression and development.”).
169. See 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2017) (defining hospice care as a “comprehensive
set of services . . . identified and coordinated by an interdisciplinary group to
provide for the physical, psychosocial, spiritual, and emotional needs of a
terminally ill patient and/or family members, as delineated in a specific patient
plan of care.”).
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patient and his or her family. 170 Hospices may meet the spiritual
needs of their patients by providing spiritual counseling in
accordance with the patient’s and family’s acceptance of this
service, and in a manner consistent with the patient’s and family’s
beliefs and desires. 171 Family bereavement assessments also are
required, and these assessments must identify the spiritual factors
that may impact family members’ ability to cope with the patient’s
death.172 Once the family members’ bereavement needs are
identified, Medicare requires participating hospices to provide
family bereavement counseling for up to one year following the
In
addition
to
hospices,
other
patient’s
death.173
Medicare-participating providers, including long-term care
facilities, also are required to assess patients’ spiritual needs. 174
In practice, attorneys who represent hospices as well as
attorneys who represent terminally ill patients are frequently
asked to provide advice regarding whether a hospice failed to
assess and/or meet the spiritual needs of the patient or a family
member. These cases typically occur when hospice workers do not
identify a patient’s expressed need as spiritual and therefore do
not meet that need. During my practice, examples of needs that
hospice patients and/or their family members identified as
spiritual included name brands of foods, name brands of drinks,
name brands of coffee and espresso, live music, recorded music,
radio music, television, movies, candles, cigars, incense,
marijuana, herbs, oils, soaps, shampoos, conditioners, books,
magazines, clothing, jewelry, hair styles, décor, objects, and other
items.
No federal statute or regulation expressly defines the word
“spiritual” or the phrase “spiritual needs.” Federal and state laws
170. See id. § 418.54 (requiring the hospice to conduct a comprehensive
assessment of the spiritual and other needs of each hospice patient and his or her
family); id. § 418.56(a) (requiring the hospice to designate an interdisciplinary
group of individuals who will work together to meet the spiritual and other needs
of each hospice patients and his or her family).
171. See id. § 418.64(d)(3) (identifying spiritual counseling as a core hospice
service).
172. Id. § 418.54(c)(7).
173. Id. § 418.66(d)(1).
174. See id. § 488.110 (requiring Medicare surveyors to assess whether
Medicare-participating long-term care providers are meeting their residents’
spiritual needs).
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do define “palliative care” to include care that addresses spiritual
needs, 175 and federal law also require hospices to “facilitate visits
by local clergy, pastoral counselors, or other individuals who can
support the patient’s spiritual needs.” 176 Some state regulations
offer definitions for the phrase “spiritual counselor;” that is, a
“person who is ordained clergy (individual ordained for religious
service), pastoral counselor or other person who can support the
patient’s spiritual needs.” 177 And, some local tax codes include
within their definition of “charitable organization” organizations
that minister to the spiritual needs of persons, thereby lessening a
government burden. 178 But none of these federal or state laws
expressly defines the word “spiritual” or the phrase “spiritual
need.”
Although falling short of offering such definitions, one line of
cases sheds light on the relationship between spirituality and
religion. 179 This line of cases rejects the inclusion of anything an
individual just happens to find spiritually significant as within the
definition of religion protected under the First Amendment.180 In
175. See id. § 418.3 (“Palliative care means patient and family-centered care
that optimizes quality of life by anticipating, preventing, and treating suffering.
Palliative care . . . involves addressing physical, intellectual, emotional, social,
and spiritual needs and to facilitate patient autonomy, access to information, and
choice.”); see also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19a-495-6a(28) (2016) (defining
palliative care under Connecticut law); see also 130 MASS. CODE REGS. § 437.402
(2016) (defining palliative care under Massachusetts law).
176. 42 C.F.R. § 418.64(d)(3)(iii) (2017).
177. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19a-495-6a(42) (2016).
178. See Catholic Health Initiatives v. City of Pueblo, 207 P.3d 812, 816 (Colo.
2009) (citing the definition of charitable organization set forth in Pueblo,
Colorado’s Municipal Code).
179. Although the Supreme Court has attempted to establish standards that
distinguish religious beliefs and actions from nonreligious beliefs and actions, the
Supreme Court has not articulated one definition of religion that should be used
in all contexts for all questions. However, a series of Supreme Court cases,
published since 1890, suggest context-specific understandings of the term. See,
e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (expressing religion in traditional
theistic terms: “[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his will.”).
180. See, e.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“While the First Amendment must be held to protect unfamiliar and
idiosyncratic as well as commonly recognized religions, it loses its sense and thus
its ability to protect when carried to the extreme proposed by the plaintiffs.”).
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Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 181 for example, the court held that a
work of art was not imbued with religious content for purposes of
the First Amendment just because the work affected the plaintiff
on a spiritual or emotional level. 182
A second line of cases suggests that spirituality concerns the
meaning of life at a more general level than does religion. In
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Nicholson, 183 for
example, taxpayers argued that the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) advanced religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause through its integration of faith and spirituality concerns
into health care services provided to veterans. 184 The VA offered
its understanding of spirituality during the litigation:
“[S]pirituality is not necessarily religious because it concerns the
meaning of life on a more general level.” 185
Also falling short of an express definition, a third line of cases
suggests a relatively low standard for characterizing something as
spiritual. 186 Mississippi law, for example, limits the individuals
who may conduct a marriage to ministers, rabbis, judges, mayors,
and any “other spiritual leader of any other religious body
authorized under the rules of such religious body to solemnize rites
of matrimony and being in good standing.”187 In In re Blackwell, 188
a widow challenged her husband’s will devising real property to
181. 94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996).
182. See id. at 1231 (holding that the statements of an individual attesting to
her emotional and spiritual response to a work of art, including the fact that the
work of art moved the individual to tears, “does not imbue the work with religious
content”); see also Johnson v. Pa. Bureau Corrs., 661 F. Supp. 425, 436 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (holding that the Spiritual Order of Universal Beings did not qualify as a
religion protected under the First Amendment because the spiritual leader
testified that the order’s belief system is “eclectic” and that each member may
adopt the beliefs of any religion or philosophy).
183. 469 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
184. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 609,
617 (W.D. Wis. 2007), vacated and remanded, 536 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2008)
(taxpayers lacked standing to challenge Veterans Administration programs).
185. Id. at 614.
186. See, e.g., Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church, 201 Cal. App.
4th 1041, 1055 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a church preschool teacher is a
spiritual leader for purposes of the ministerial exception to enforcement of civil
employment law).
187. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-17 (West 2016).
188. 531 So. 2d 1193 (Miss. 1988).
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the husband’s first wife. 189 In their counterclaim, the husband’s
siblings argued that the widow and the decedent were not legally
married under Mississippi law because the individual who
presided over the ceremony uniting the widow and decedent was
not a spiritual leader under Mississippi Law.190 That individual, a
constable by trade, claimed that the blank credentials he secured
from the Universal Life Church (ULC) of Modesto, California—
credentials that he had to fill in with his own name upon receipt
in the mail—empowered him to marry the widow and decedent.191
On review, the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that ULC
was “hardly a conventional church by Bible Belt standards”
because ULC had no formal doctrine, members could worship God
in any way they saw fit, and its ministers were not required to
learn anything about ULC or any particular religious beliefs before
becoming ministers. 192 The court declined, however, to establish a
“hard-edged line of demarcation prescribing minimum
qualifications” for a spiritual leader under Mississippi law, holding
that the individual was “enough of a ‘spiritual leader’” that the
marriage between the widow and the decedent was legal.193
Although the Supreme Court of Mississippi in In re Blackwell
established a relatively low standard for those wishing to qualify
as spiritual leaders, a fourth line of cases confirms that spirituality
does have some content. In In re Fuhrer, 194 for example, the
Supreme Court of Richmond County, New York, was asked to
decide whether grand jury questions put to a witness—a rabbi—
implicated the state’s clergyman-penitent privilege. 195 The
questions at issue were designed to elicit whether the rabbi was
depositing checks from nursing home vendors and then returning
a percentage of them to employees in violation of Medicaid
anti-kickback rules. 196 The court stated that although the
189. Id. at 1194.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 100 Misc. 2d 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
195. See id. at 320 (quoting the New York clergyman-penitent privilege: “a
clergyman . . . shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to
him in his professional character as spiritual advisor”).
196. Id. at 316–17.
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statutory privilege should be interpreted “broadly and liberally,”
the communication to the Rabbi must be, at the very least, in the
Rabbi’s “professional character as a spiritual advisor” in order to
be privileged. 197 The court interpreted the phrase “professional
character as a spiritual advisor” to mean “seeking religious
counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration.”198 Without
defining the words religious or spiritual, the court concluded that
the privilege had no application to the case because none of the
questions put to the rabbi involved spiritual matters. 199
Research revealed one century-old murder case expressly
defining the word “spiritual.” In Johnson v. State, 200 the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in 1914 reviewed the admissibility of a
confession secured by a reporter from the defendant while the
defendant was in jail. 201 Before obtaining the confession, the
reporter made the following representation to the defendant: “I am
a Spiritualist, and I can look down in your black heart and see this
diabolical crime you committed at midnight the other night.” 202
The defense argued that the subsequent confession was
inadmissible because it was neither free nor voluntary; that is, the
confession resulted from actual, physical fear, threat, and undue
influence. 203 The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the
reporter’s
statements
constituted
permissible
spiritual
influence. 204
The court agreed with the defense, holding that the reporter
used more than spiritual influence to elicit the confession. 205 The
court defined spiritual—with respect to the hopes and dreams of a
defendant charged with murder from whom a confession is
sought—as “that which pertains to the soul or higher endowments
of the mind in its relation to the Spirit of God—the Holy Spirit—
and that which pertains to our holy religion. The spiritual nature
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 320.
Id. at 320–21.
Id.
65 So. 218 (Miss. 1914).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 220.
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of a man would be his higher self, not the carnal.” 206 The court
concluded that the reporter’s statements conveyed supernatural
powers, not just lay notions of spirituality, and that the
representation of such supernatural powers constituted undue
influence vis-à-vis the defendant. 207
The federal and state regulations and cases discussed above
suggest that the test for spirituality is considerably less rigorous,
and significantly more general, than the test for religion, and that
spirituality does not rise to the level of the supernatural. 208
Although helpful, these authorities still do not provide practicing
health care attorneys with the specificity they need to bring an
action against a hospice or defend a case involving a hospice that
allegedly fails to meet a patient’s or family member’s spiritual
needs.
Industry guidance and scholarly writings 209 are somewhat
more helpful. Several groups and institutions have developed
spiritual assessment tools that assist health care providers in
eliciting patients’ thoughts and beliefs relating to religion and
spirituality. 210 These spiritual assessment tools, including the
FICA Spiritual History Tool (FICA),211 the HOPE Questions

206. Id.
207. Id.
A man ill and nervous could be thrown into a serious physical fear and
constraint, even though from superstition, which is a fear of that which
is unknown or mysterious, by the intense statement of one who claimed
he was a spiritualist—that is, one who holds communications with
departed and disembodied spirits . . . .
208. See supra notes 175–207 and accompanying text (illustrating and
supporting the proposition that the legislative and judicial framework for
determining spirituality is less rigorous than the test for religion).
209. See supra note 168 (offering definitions and comparisons of religion and
spirituality in scholarly writings).
210. See Aaron Saguil & Karen Phelps, The Spiritual Assessment, 86 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 546, 546 (2012) (explaining the purpose of spiritual assessment tools).
211. See FICA Spiritual Assessment Tool, GEORGE WASH. INST. FOR
SPIRITUALITY AND HEALTH, https://smhs.gwu.edu/gwish/clinical/fica (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (providing information about the FICA Spiritual Assessment Tool)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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(HOPE), 212 and the Open Invite Mnemonic (OIM), 213 suggest
meaning for spirituality. For example, one FICA question asks,
“Do you have spiritual beliefs that help you cope with stress?” 214 If
the patient responds ‘no,’ FICA encourages the follow-up question:
“What gives your life meaning?”215 At some level, then, the FICA
spiritual assessment tool associates an individual’s spirituality to
the meaning of life. 216
Although many of the HOPE questions use the word
spirituality, one HOPE question asks, “What are your sources of
hope, strength, comfort, and peace?” 217 A second HOPE question
asks, “What do you hold on to during difficult times?” 218 The HOPE
questions suggest that spirituality is associated with sources of
meaning, hope, strength, comfort, peace, and security.
Similarly, the OIM includes questions such as, “[w]hat helps
you through hard times?” and “[i]s there a way in which I or
another member of the medical team can provide you with
support?” and “[a]re there resources in your faith community that
you would like for me to help mobilize on your behalf?” 219 Like
FICA and HOPE, the OIM questions associate spirituality with
support.
Recognizing the difficulty associated with precisely defining
spirituality, the authors of the HOPE spiritual assessment tool
explain that spirituality is complex and multidimensional; that it
has cognitive, experiential, and behavioral aspects; that it includes
the search for meaning, purpose, and truth; that it includes the
beliefs and values by which an individual lives; that it involves
feelings of hope, love, connection, inner peace, comfort, and
support; and that it includes the types of relationships and
connections that exist with self, the community, the environment,
212. See Gowri Anandarajah & Ellen Hight, Spirituality and Medical
Practice: Using the HOPE Questions as a Practical Tool for Spiritual Assessment,
63 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 81, 85–86 (2001) (discussing the HOPE Questions).
213. See Saguil & Phelps, supra note 210, at 549, tbl. 3 (illustrating the OIM).
214. See id. at 548 (listing several FICA questions).
215. Id.
216. See id. (illustrating FICA questions).
217. Anandarajah & Hight, supra note 212, at 87, tbl. 4.
218. Id.
219. See Saguil & Phelps, supra note 210, at 549 (illustrating the Open Invite
Mnemonic).
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nature, and the transcendent.220 The authors of the HOPE
questions further explain that many individuals find spirituality
“through religion or through a personal relationship with the
divine,” but that others may find it “through a connection to
nature, through music and the arts, through a set of values and
principles or through a quest for scientific truth.” 221
Given the complex and multidimensional nature of
spirituality, I do not recommend that HHS issue an NPRM
attempting to craft a precise regulatory definition. However, I do
recommend that HHS issue a draft guidance document outlining
the dimensions of spirituality in a manner similar to the HOPE
authors’ description of spirituality 222 and with reference to the
definitions of spirituality found in scholarly writings. 223 Using the
FICA, HOPE, and OIM questions, HHS should provide examples
of expressed needs that, in certain contexts, would or would not
meet the definition of a spiritual need for purposes of federal
hospice law. 224 Given the frequency in my practice with which
hospice patients and family members asserted that name brands
of foods, name brands of drinks, name brands of coffee and
espresso, live music, recorded music, radio music, television,
movies, candles, cigars, incense, marijuana, herbs, oils, soaps,
shampoos, conditioners, books, magazines, clothing, jewelry, hair
styles, décor, objects, and other items constituted spiritual needs,
the HHS guidance should address if, when, and in which contexts
these
items
would
constitute
spiritual
needs
that
Medicare-participating hospices must meet. In the preface to the
draft guidance document, HHS should solicit comments from
individuals with expertise in spirituality as well as religious
studies and should adjust the final HHS guidance document
accordingly. In terms of format and accessibility, this guidance
should be modeled on prior HHS guidance documents that are
220. Anandarajah & Hight, supra note 212, at 83.
221. Id.
222. See id. (providing HOPE’s description of the concept of spirituality as
being complex and multidimensional).
223. See supra note 168 (providing definitions of spirituality found in
illustrative scholarly writings).
224. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that federal law
requires Medicare-participating hospices to assess and meet the spiritual needs
of patients and family members).
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readily available on the Internet and that provide guidance and
illustrations relating to other complex health law topics. 225
V. Health Information Confidentiality
Parts II through IV discussed the intersection of religion and
federal law governing Medicare payment of RNHCI, home health,
and hospice care. 226 Religion also intersects federal and state laws
governing health information confidentiality, including laws
applicable to health care providers who electronically transmit
health information in connection with claims for payment to
Medicare, Medicaid, and other third party payors. I will use the
federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) Privacy Rule (Privacy Rule) 227 as an example, although
many states have analogous laws that have similar intersections
with religion.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule is a set of regulations promulgated
by HHS that governs health information confidentiality at the
federal level. 228 The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to all health
plans and all health care clearinghouses, but only certain health
care providers; that is, health care providers who transmit health
information in electronic form in connection with certain standard
transactions (collectively, covered entities). 229 The most common
standard transaction is the health care claim transaction, which is
implicated when a physician, hospital, or other individual or
institutional health care provider electronically transmits health
information to a public health care program such as Medicare or
Medicaid or a private payor as part of a request for reimbursement
for health care delivered to a patient who is a beneficiary or an
225. See supra notes 126–128 (referencing other guidance documents released
by HHS).
226. Supra Parts II–IV.
227. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2017).
228. See id. (codifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
229. See id. § 160.102(a)(1)–(3) (identifying health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health information in
electronic form in connection with a standard transaction as needing to comply
with the HIPAA Administrative Simplification Provisions); id. § 164.500(a)
(requiring covered entities to comply with the Privacy Rule).
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enrollee. 230 Because Medicare generally requires health care
providers to submit their health care claims electronically, 231
Medicare-participating providers must comply with the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.232 Health information confidentiality obligations are
thus linked to heath care finance, and academics and attorneys
with expertise in health care finance frequently work with the
health information confidentiality requirements set forth in the
HIPAA Privacy Rule.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities to adhere
to certain use and disclosure requirements 233 when internally
using or externally disclosing individually identifiable health
information that meets the definition of protected health
information (PHI). 234 PHI includes patient identifiable medical
records, billing records, and other designated record sets, including
lists of current hospital inpatients and outpatients. 235 Religion
intersects the Privacy Rule’s information use and disclosure
requirements in several different ways. One way relates to the use
and disclosure of PHI by hospital chaplains. Some background
information regarding hospital chaplaincy is necessary before
proceeding.
230. See id. § 160.103 (identifying the health care claim as one of the standard
transactions).
231. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET: MEDICARE BILLING: 837P AND FORM CMS-1500 4
(2013) (“Initial claims for payment under Medicare must be submitted
electronically unless a health care professional or supplier qualifies for a waiver
or exception from the Administrative Simplification Compliance Act (ASCA)
requirement for electronic submission of claims.”).
232. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUBL’N NO. 03-5388,
PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/medrec/research_HIPAA
01v.pdf (“For example, hospitals, academic medical centers, physicians, and other
health care providers who electronically transmit claims transaction information
directly or through an intermediary to a health plan are covered entities.”).
233. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502–164.514 (2016) (codifying the HIPAA Privacy
Rule’s use and disclosure requirements).
234. See id. § 160.103 (defining PHI).
235. See Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information
45
C.F.R.
§ 164.524,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/access (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (noting that “designated record set,” a subset of PHI, includes
medical records and billing records) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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When a hospital employs or contracts with a minister, priest,
pastor, rabbi, or other clergyperson to provide religious or spiritual
services to patients in its facility, the provision of such services is
known as hospital chaplaincy and the individuals who provide
such services are known as hospital chaplains. 236 The services
provided by hospital chaplains are extensive and include religious
and spiritual services as well as other services. 237
Hospital chaplain services that are partly or mostly religious
or spiritual in nature include, but certainly are not limited to:
offering patients, family, and staff members an emotionally and
spiritually safe professional from whom they can seek counsel or
guidance, performing spiritual assessments of patients,
performing patient risk screenings, including identifying patients
whose religious beliefs or spiritual conflicts may help, compromise,
or hinder their recovery from illness, charting religious or spiritual
activities in patient medical records, discussing with hospital
workforce members particular patient beliefs regarding the
healing power of religion or spirituality, providing grief and loss
care; discussing with patients or family members religious and
spiritual beliefs regarding organ and tissue donation and
transplantation, designing and leading religious ceremonies of
worship and ritual including prayer, meditation, reading of holy
texts, observation of holy days, blessings, sacraments, memorial
services, funerals, and birth and death rituals, making community
and professional presentations regarding the relationship between
religion or spirituality and health, training and supervising
volunteers from religious communities who provide religious or
spiritual care to hospital patients; conducting professional clinical
education programs for seminarians, clergypersons, and religious
leaders; developing congregational health ministries, educating
health professional students, interns, residents, and fellows
regarding the relationships between and among religion,
spirituality, health, and medicine, engaging in research activities
236. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy Under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule: Health Care or “Just Visiting the Sick,” 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 51,
66 (2005) [hereinafter Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy] (discussing the history of
clinical pastoral education and American hospital chaplaincy) (internal citations
and references omitted).
237. For a history of the relationship between religion and medicine in
general and hospital chaplaincy and health care in particular, see id. at 59–73.
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relating to the development of religious and spiritual assessment,
and promoting research investigating the relationship between or
among, as appropriate, religion, spirituality, medicine, and
health. 238
Hospital chaplains also provide additional non-religious and
non-spiritual services in their roles as general employees or
workforce members of covered hospitals. These services include,
but are not limited to: communicating with caregivers, facilitating
staff meetings and other communications, resolving conflicts
among staff members, patients, and family members, referring
patients to internal and external resources including other health
care providers, patient advocates, and community and social
resources; providing institutional support during change or crisis,
participating in rounds and patient care conferences, participating
in interdisciplinary education, assisting patients and families in
executing or completing advance directives, participating in ethics
committees and institutional review boards, clarifying the
application of institutional policies and behaviors to patients,
community clergy, and religious organizations; conducting or
participating in general educational programs, interpreting and
analyzing cultural traditions that may impact clinical services;
representing community issues and concerns to the organization,
and acting as “cultural brokers” between institutions, patients,
and family members.239
In light of the many services they provide, many hospital
chaplains view themselves, and many health care institutions view
hospital chaplains, as part of the hospital’s health care team.240 Dr.
Harold Koenig, Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
and Director of the Center for Spirituality, Theology, and Health
at Duke University Medical Center, has recommended the full
integration of hospital chaplains into the multidisciplinary health
care team, including their participation in morning and afternoon
238. See, e.g., id. at 69 (identifying the religious and spiritual functions and
duties of today’s hospital chaplain (citations omitted)).
239. See, e.g., id. at 69–70 (identifying additional chaplain functions and
duties) (citations omitted).
240. See, e.g., Rodney J. Hunter, Pastoral Care and Healthcare Chaplaincy,
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1975, at 1976–77 (Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed.
2004) (“[T]hey view themselves as significant members of the healthcare team,
and increasingly are being viewed in that way by the medical professions.”).
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rounds with physicians, nurses, and other licensed health care
professionals and their participation in patient discharge
planning. 241 Dr. Robert Orr, Co-chair of the Healthcare Ethics
Council and Senior Fellow with The Center for Bioethics & Human
Dignity at Trinity International University, also has recommended
that hospital chaplains serve as important consultants to the
health care team.242
A review of current hospital policies and procedures indicates
that many hospitals expressly recognize chaplains as members of
the health care team.243 For example, Brackenridge University
Medical Center in Austin, Texas, considers its chaplains to be
members of the interdisciplinary patient care team.244 Orlando
Regional Medical Center in Orlando, Florida, also considers its
chaplains to be integral members of the health care team. 245 At
Yale-New Haven Hospital, chaplains participate fully in patient
care meetings.246
In institutions in which they are viewed as part of the health
care team, chaplains frequently “chart” in accordance with 2009
Association of Professional Chaplains (APC) standards; that is,
they document the religious or spiritual care they provide to
241. See generally HAROLD G. KOENIG ET AL., HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND
HEALTH 451 (2d ed. 2001).
242. See generally Robert D. Orr & Leigh B. Genesen, Requests for
‘Inappropriate’ Treatment Based on Religious Beliefs, 23 J. Med. Ethics 142, 146
(1997) (“This individual should serve as a consultant to the care-team . . . .”).
243. See, e.g., infra notes 244–246 (illustrating hospitals in Texas, Florida and
Connecticut).
244. See Chaplain Servs. and Spiritual Care, SETON HEALTHCARE FAMILY,
https://www.seton.net/medical-services-and-programs/chaplain-services-andspiritual-care/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“In addition to providing spiritual and
emotional care, Staff Chaplains are members of the interdisciplinary patient care
team. Our Chaplains serve on numerous committees, including hospital Ethics
Committees.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See Interfaith Spiritual Care, ORLANDO REG’L MED. CTR.,
http://www.ufhealthcancerorlando.com/our-services/interfaith-spiritual-care
(last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“Patients, families, and staff alike find the hospital
chaplain to be an integral member of the healthcare team in the provision of
clinical spiritual care.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See Spiritual Care, YALE NEW HAVEN HOSP., http://www.ynhh.org/
patient-information/religious-ministries.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (noting
chaplain “[p]articipation in patient care meetings, family meetings and
interdisciplinary team meeting”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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patients in medical records in the same way that physicians,
nurses, or other licensed health care professionals document the
medical, nursing, and other care they provide to patients. 247 The
practice of chaplain medical record charting has become so
commonplace that leaders of an APC conference workshop on
electronic documentation stated (more than five years ago) that,
“[w]e are not here to discuss if chaplains should chart. That
question has been resolved.”248
Hospital chaplains are not always viewed as part of the health
care team, however. A second view of hospital chaplaincy is a
middle view, one in which the hospital chaplain walks between the
distinct—sometimes
complementary
but
sometimes
contradictory—worlds of religion and health. Massachusetts
General Hospital, for example, describes its chaplains as “liaisons,
connecting members of the health care team, patients and families,
and, if requested, clergy or other religious leaders in the
community.”249 Reverend Lawrence Holst, author of Hospital
Ministry: The Role of the Chaplain Today, explains this middle
approach as follows: “In many hospitals the chaplains’ garb is a
white or blue clinical coat inscribed with a cross—symbols of
medicine and religion. Often these two worlds are complementary,
but sometimes they are contradictory.” 250
A third view of hospital chaplaincy directly challenges the
inclusion of the chaplain in the health care team. In an article
published in 2007, Drs. Roberta Springer Loewy and Erich Loewy
247. See, e.g., ASS’N OF PROF’L CHAPLAINS, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
HOSPITAL CHAPLAINS IN ACUTE CARE, Standard 3, at 6 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“The
chaplain enters information into the patient’s medical record that is relevant to
the patient’s medical, psycho-social, and spiritual/religious goals of care.”).
248. David B. McCurdy, Chaplains, Confidentiality, and the Chart, 28
CHAPLAINCY TODAY 20, 20 (2012) [hereinafter McCurdy, Chaplains] (referencing
George Handzo, Susan Wintz & Cassie McCarty, If it’s Not in the Chart, it Didn’t
Happen: The Challenges and Opportunities of EMRs, Workshop, 2012 APC
Annual Conference, Schaumburg, IL, June 2012).
249. See Chaplaincy Department, MASS. GEN. HOSP., http://www.mghpcs.
org/chaplaincy/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (“As partners in healing, Massachusetts
General Hospital chaplains are spiritual caregivers serving patients, families,
visitors and staff through comfort, encouragement and prayer.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
250. Lawrence E. Holst, Hospital Chaplain Between Worlds, in
HEALTH/MEDICINE AND THE FAITH TRADITIONS: AN INQUIRY INTO RELIGION AND
MEDICINE 293 (Marin E. Marty & Kenneth L. Vaux, eds. 1982).
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argued that it was unnecessary and perhaps even
counterproductive for a chaplain to be fully involved in patient care
and to have access to a patient’s medical record. 251
In settings in which the hospital chaplain is viewed as part of
the health care team, or as a liaison to the health care team, the
chaplains’ use and disclosure of PHI must comply with the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.252 The HIPAA Privacy Rule contains three rules of
251. See Roberta Springer Loewy & Erich H. Loewy, Healthcare and the
Hospital Chaplain, 9 MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 53, 53 (2007) [hereinafter Loewy &
Loewy, Healthcare and the Hospital Chaplain]
Moreover, many chaplains and chaplaincy programs have begun to
assume that chaplains are full-fledged members of the healthcare
team, complete with access to patients’ medical records both to gather
information and to make notations of their own.
....
It would appear that such novel activities are being justified by a
questionable set of claims and assumptions that includes: (1) the claim
that chaplains have a spiritual—as opposed to purely religious—
expertise that entitles them to interact with patients and/or significant
others (even those who have not requested a chaplain)—presumably
without in the least compromising patient autonomy or the
confidentiality of the patient/healthcare professional relationship;
(2) the assumption that the terms “spirituality” and “religiosity”
mutually entail one another; (3) the claim that the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) mandates
“spiritual assessments” (which it does not); (4) the assumption that
chaplains are full-fledged members of the healthcare team; and (5) the
claim that chaplains must, therefore, be permitted access to patients
and patients’ medical records both to gather information and to make
notations of their own. We consider such claims and assumptions
disquieting, and suggest that it is high time we revisit the terms
‘chaplaincy,’ ‘healthcare professional,’ and ‘member of the healthcare
team’ in reassessing what our professional commitments to respect and
protect the bio-psycho-social integrity of patients require.
....
We have argued that, aside from the legalities of the issue, it is not
necessary—indeed, it may even be counterproductive—for a chaplain
to have access to patients’ medical records. While it is true that a
patient’s spiritual needs may differ depending on the diagnosis, it is up
to patients to determine what they wish to disclose or to be disclosed
to chaplains or other spiritual counselors.
252. See Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy, supra note 236, at 53–54 (discussing
HHS’ Privacy Rule, which implements one section of the Administrative
Simplification provisions set forth in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), and regulates both uses and disclosures of
protected health information by certain persons and organizations that fall within
the definition of a covered entity).
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patient permission, one of which must be satisfied before a covered
entity, or employee or workforce member thereof, such as a
hospital chaplain, uses or discloses PHI. 253
Under the first rule, no form of prior patient permission is
required before a covered entity, or employee or workforce member
thereof, may use or disclose a patient’s PHI.254 This rule is limited
to uses and disclosures of PHI necessary to carry out treatment,
payment, or health care operations activities, or one of twelve
public policy activities. 255 In the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS
carefully defines the terms treatment,256 payment, 257 and health
care operations 258 to include certain clinical activities and
necessary administrative and support services.
Under the second rule, a covered entity may conduct five sets
of information uses and disclosures once the individual who is the
subject of the information has been notified of the use or disclosure
and has either agreed or not objected to the use or disclosure. 259
One set of information uses and disclosures permitted under the
second rule involves the use and disclosure of directory
information, defined to include the patient’s name, location in the
hospital facility (e.g., Room 421), general condition described in

253. See, e.g., id. at 73–75 (discussing the three rules of individual
permission).
254. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a), (c)(1) (2017) (allowing covered entities to use
and disclose PHI for treatment, payment, and health care operations without
prior patient authorization).
255. See id. § 164.512 (identifying the twelve public policy activities for which
no prior patient authorization is needed).
256. See id. § 164.501 (“[T]reatment [includes] coordination or management
of health care by a health care provider with a third party; consultation between
health care providers relating to a patient; or the referral of a patient for health
care from one health care provider to another.”).
257. See id. (defining payment to include the activities undertaken by a
“health care provider or health plan to obtain or provide reimbursement for the
provision of health care”; setting forth an itemized list of activities that constitute
payment).
258. See id. (defining health care operations to include six paragraphs’ worth
of administrative and other activities necessary to the delivery and financing of
health care).
259. See id. §§ 164.510, 164.510(a)(2) (requiring a health care provider to give
the patient the opportunity to restrict or prohibit certain uses or disclosures of
healthcare information before allowing the clergy access to that information).
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one word (e.g., good, fair, poor, stable), and religious affiliation
(e.g., Catholic). 260
Under the third rule, a covered entity must obtain the
patient’s prior written authorization for any use or disclosure that
is not permitted under the first two rules of patient permission. 261
The authorization form is heavily regulated by HHS and must
include a number of required elements and statements in order to
comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.262
When a hospital chaplain uses or discloses PHI to carry out a
religious service, spiritual activity, or other duty of employment,
the use or disclosure must fall within one of the three rules of
patient permission in order to comply with the HIPAA Privacy
Rule. 263 Practicing health care attorneys, hospital chaplains,
community clergypersons, health law scholars, and other
stakeholders debate the applicability of the HIPAA rules to
chaplain uses and disclosures.
The first rule, for example, allows health care providers to use
and disclose PHI without prior patient authorization for
“treatment,” defined to include the provision, coordination, or
management of “health care” and related services by one or more
“health care providers” as well as the coordination or management
of health care by a provider with a third party.264 It would be
legally helpful, then, for hospital chaplains if they fell within the
definition of a “health care provider” and if the services they
provided constituted “treatment” or “health care” for purposes of
the Privacy Rule.265 However, HHS explained in the preamble to a
260. See id. § 164.510(a) (listing basic patient information that a covered
entity can use or disclose as long as the patient has the opportunity to object).
261. See id. § 164.508(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise permitted or required by
this subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health
information without an authorization that is valid under this section.”).
262. See id. § 164.508(c)(1) (listing the core elements of a HIPAA-compliant
authorization form); id. § 164.508(c)(2) (listing the required statements of a
HIPAA-compliant authorization form).
263. See Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy, supra note 236, at 58 (“[I]f a hospitalemployed chaplain wishes to use PHI maintained by the covered hospital to carry
out his or her job duties, the internal use of the information by the employed
chaplain also must be made in accordance with the use and disclosure
requirements set forth in the Privacy Rule.”).
264. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2017) (defining treatment).
265. The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines health care as “care, services, or
supplies related to the health of an individual . . . includ[ing] . . . . Preventive,
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final rulemaking published on December 28, 2000, that: “‘[H]ealth
care’ as defined under the rule does not include methods of healing
that are solely spiritual. Therefore, clergy or other religious
practitioners that provide solely religious healing services are not
health care providers within the meaning of this rule.” 266 In the
sixteen years since HHS authored this preamble language,
stakeholders have debated its meaning.267 For example, does HHS
think that all of the services that hospital chaplains and other
clergy provide constitute “solely religious” or “solely spiritual”
services and, thus, their work never constitutes “health care?” 268
Or, does HHS believe that hospital chaplains and other
clergypersons provide a range of services, some of which are
religious or spiritual in nature and others that constitute “health
care?” 269 If the latter is true, would HHS classify the hospital
chaplains who provide counseling and assessment services that
fall within the definition of health care as “health care
diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, and
counseling, service, assessment, or procedure with respect to the physical or
mental condition . . . of an individual or that affects the structure or function of
the body . . . .” Id. § 160.103.
266. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,568 (Dec. 28, 2000).
267. See, e.g., Loewy & Loewy, Healthcare and the Hospital Chaplain, supra
note 251, at 60
So, what are we suggesting? We are suggesting that chaplains visit
only those patients who, upon admission to a healthcare facility or at
any time thereafter, have indicated—either in a designated space on
the admission sheet or by verbal request—that they wish to be visited
by a chaplain. It is our position that, if a patient indicates that he or
she would not like such a visit, it should be recorded in the medical
record and the chaplaincy office should be notified not to visit the
patient. If a patient does wish to be visited by a chaplain, it should be
recorded in the medical record and a request forwarded to the
chaplaincy office. In cases in which it is unclear what the patient’s
wishes may be, then a member of the patient’s healthcare team should
ask the patient or designated surrogate for clarification.
See also McCurdy, Chaplains, supra note 248, at 20 (“I maintain that chaplains
should have access to patients’ records on a need-to-know basis and the
opportunity to write in the chart. I also think chaplains’ approach to
confidentiality requires a richer, more nuanced understanding of confidentiality
in their complex role than has emerged to date.”).
268. See Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy, supra note 236, at 76 (offering these
questions).
269. Id.
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providers”? 270 Or, perhaps, can a hospital chaplain constitute a
“third party” (for purposes of the definition of “treatment”) who is
permitted to work with a health care provider to provide,
coordinate, or manage “health care”? Or, perhaps HHS was simply
referring to clergy who are authorized to represent their particular
faith groups in the community (known as community
clergypersons), rather than hospital chaplains whose job duties
include providing requested religious, spiritual, and other services
to patients in the hospital facility. 271
The answers to these questions are legally important. If the
preamble is interpreted to mean that HHS believes that hospital
chaplains only provide religious or spiritual services, the technical
result is that the work of a hospital chaplain does not fit within the
first tier of patient permission and someone must obtain the prior
written authorization of each patient before the chaplain may use
or disclose that patient’s PHI under the third rule, unless the work
of the hospital chaplain is limited to that which fits within the
second rule. 272
Under the second rule, hospital chaplains are permitted to
receive a patient’s directory information, defined to include the
patient’s name, the patient’s location in the hospital, the patient’s
general condition described in one word, and the patient’s religious
affiliation if the patient has agreed to the disclosure of his or her
directory information orally or in writing or has been informed of
the use and disclosure and has not objected.273 Although hospital
chaplains who have access to such directory information can
identify and locate patients in the hospital for purposes of meeting
patients and providing religious or spiritual services at the
bedside, many of their other job duties, including participating in
hospital ethics committee meetings, institutional review board
meetings, patient care rounds, and patient care meetings, would
270. Id.
271. See id. at 80–81 (carefully distinguishing community clergypersons from
hospital chaplains).
272. See id. at 77 (explaining this legal result in more detail). Drs. Loewy
would agree with this interpretation. Loewy & Loewy, supra note 251.
273. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(1)(i) (2017) (“A covered health care provider
must inform an individual of . . . disclosures to clergy of information regarding
religious affiliation and provide the individual with the opportunity to
restrict . . . [the] disclosures . . . .”).
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be severely restricted if not prohibited if their activities only fit
within the second rule.274 Stated another way, if the work of
chaplains is limited to that which fits within the second rule,
hospital chaplains are relegated to “just visiting the sick.” 275
These interpretation options are not satisfying to many
stakeholders who hold a nuanced understanding of the
multidimensional role of the hospital chaplain. 276 I therefore
recommend that HHS issue a NPRM proposing to amend 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.501 in accordance with the italicized language set forth
below. The purpose of these amendments would be to allow both
health care and religion to coexist in health care settings.
Technically, these amendments would add a new definition of
“health care chaplain” and would situate the religious, spiritual,
and other work of the health care chaplain within the definition of
“health care operations.”
The regulatory result of these amendments would be that:
(1) the use and disclosure of PHI by a hospital chaplain would be
permitted under the first rule of patient permission without the
patient’s prior written authorization; and (2) the use and
disclosure of directory information by a community clergyperson
would remain limited to the second rule. In addition, the
placement of the work of hospital chaplains within the definition
of “health care operations,” not “treatment,” would respond to
those stakeholders who urge distinction between licensed health
care providers on the one hand and hospital chaplains and other
clergypersons on the other.
45 C.F.R. § 164.501—Definitions
As used in this subpart, the following terms have the following
meanings:
Health care chaplain means a priest, pastor, rabbi, minister, or
other clergyperson who is employed or contracted by a covered
health care institution to provide religious, spiritual, and other
274. See Tovino, Hospital Chaplaincy, supra note 236, at 78 (explaining this
result).
275. See, e.g., id. (examining “Hospital Chaplaincy Under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule: Health Care or ‘Just Visiting the Sick’?”).
276. See McCurdy, Chaplains, supra note 248, at 20 (arguing for a more
nuanced understanding of the role of the hospital chaplain and the chaplain’s
confidentiality obligations than has emerged to date).

1682

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1623 (2017)

services to patients and families within the covered health care
institution. The term does not include community
clergypersons, defined as individuals who serve as religious or
spiritual leaders of their faith traditions in the community.
Health care operations means any of the following activities of
the covered entity to the extent that the activities are related to
covered functions:
(1) Conducting quality assessment and improvement activities,
including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical
guidelines, provided that the obtaining of generalizable
knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies resulting
from such activities; patient safety activities (as defined in 42
CFR § 3.20); population-based activities relating to improving
health or reducing health care costs, protocol development, case
management and care coordination, contacting of health care
providers and patients with information about treatment
alternatives; and related functions that do not include
treatment, including the provision of religious, spiritual, and
other services by health care chaplains.

In the NPRM, HHS should solicit comments from professional
chaplains, professional chaplain associations, and other
stakeholders with training in religious and spiritual studies. HHS
should use the commentary it receives to adjust the text of the final
regulations.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has identified four practical ways in which health,
law, and religion intersect, including intersections that have
neither been carefully addressed by the courts nor thoroughly
examined by legal academics through traditional law review
scholarship. 277 Drawing guidance from fields as wide ranging as
constitutional law, transportation law, utilities law, criminal law,
contract law, tax law, and trusts and wills law, this Article also has
proposed draft language for three sets of new federal regulations
in the areas of RNHCI law (at 42 C.F.R. §§ 403.720, 403.766), home
health care law (at 42 C.F.R. § 484.2), and the HIPAA Privacy Rule
(at 45 C.F.R. § 164.501), as well as three guidance documents
designed to advise and inform practicing health care attorneys and
277.

Infra Parts II–V.
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the general public in the areas of RNHCI law, home health care
law, and hospice law. This Article also has called on constitutional
law and law and religion scholars to bring their significant
expertise to bear on the practical yet important questions raised
herein.
Religion intersects health law in a number of ways not
illustrated in this Article, and these intersections deserve equal
study. For example, religion intersects the law governing Medicare
payment for nursing home care. As background, public-program
reimbursed nursing care 278 can be delivered by a
Medicare-participating skilled nursing facility (SNF)279 or a
Medicaid-participating
nursing
facility
(NF). 280 Federal
regulations codified at 42 C.F.R. Part 483 govern SNFs and NFs
(collectively, long-term care (LTC) facilities) that wish to receive
payment from the Medicare and/or Medicaid Programs for their
provision of nursing care to beneficiaries (LTC Requirements). 281
The LTC Requirements contain numerous provisions giving SNF
and NF residents a wide variety of rights. For example, SNF and
278. See generally Nursing Homes, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/providerenrollment-and-certification/certificationandcomplianc/nhs.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (providing basic information about certification as a Medicare
and/or Medicaid nursing home provider) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
279. SNF is defined as an institution, or a distinct part of an institution, that
is primarily engaged in providing to residents skilled nursing care and related
services for residents who require medical or nursing care or rehabilitation
services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick persons; that is not
primarily for the care and treatment of mental diseases; and that meets other
requirements set forth in federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a)(1)–(3) (2012)
(defining a skilled nursing facility).
280. An NF is defined as an institution, or a distinct part of an institution,
that is not primarily engaged in the provision of care and treatment of mental
diseases but is primarily engaged in providing to residents either: (1) skilled
nursing care and related services for residents who require medical or nursing
care; (2) rehabilitation services for the rehabilitation of injured, disabled, or sick
persons; or (3) on a regular basis, health-related care and services to individuals
who because of their mental or physical condition require care and services (above
the level of room and board) which can be made available to them only through
institutional facilities; and that meets other requirements set forth in federal law.
See id. § 1396r(a)(1)–(3) (defining a nursing facility).
281. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 483 (2017) (setting forth requirements for SNFs and
NFs (collectively, long-term care facilities who wish to participate in the Medicare
and/or Medicaid Programs)).
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NF residents have the right to exercise the rights that they have
as citizens or residents of the United States, 282 as well as the right
to be free of interference, coercion, discrimination, and reprisal
from a SNF or NF in the exercise of their rights. 283 By further
example, SNF and NF residents have the specific right to
participate in religious activities so long as such activities do not
interfere with the rights of other residents in the facility. 284
The LTC Requirements also contain other provisions that
implicate religion. For example, the LTC Requirements generally
prohibit NFs from charging, accepting, “or receiving any gift,
money, donation, or other consideration as a precondition of
admission, expedited admission, or continued stay of a Medicaid
beneficiary in [an NF].”285
This rule is designed to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries are
admitted to LTCs on a first-come, first-serve basis as beds
become available. However, an NF “may solicit, accept, or
receive a charitable ‘religious, or philanthropic contribution’
from an organization or from a person unrelated to a
Medicaid-eligible resident or potential resident, but only to the
extent that the contribution is not a condition of the resident’s
admission, expedited admission, or continued stay in the [NF]
for a Medicaid eligible resident.”286

During my practice, I used to represent NFs accused of receiving
donations from religious organizations, spiritual groups, and
secular organizations that may or may not have been in exchange
for Medicaid beneficiaries’ expedited nursing home admissions.
Religion also plays a role in the acceptability of state Medicaid
managed care options. States that require Medicaid beneficiaries
282. See id. § 483.10(b) (“The resident has the right to exercise his or her
rights as a resident of the facility and as a citizen or resident of the United
States.”).
283. See id. § 483.10(b)(2) (“The resident has the right to be free of
interference, coercion, discrimination, and reprisal from the facility in exercising
his or her rights.”).
284. See id. § 483.15(d) (“A resident has a right to participate in social,
religious, and community activities that do not interfere with the rights of other
residents in the facility.”).
285. See id. § 483.15(a)(4) (“In the case of a person eligible for Medicaid, a
nursing facility must not charge, solicit, accept, or receive . . . any gift, money,
donation, or other consideration as a precondition of admission, expedited
admission or continued stay in the facility.”).
286. Id. § 483.15(a)(4)(ii).
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to enroll in a managed care organization (MCO), prepaid inpatient
health plan (PIHP), prepaid ambulatory health plan (PAHP), or
primary care case management (PCCM) plan generally must give
those beneficiaries a choice of at least two managed care entities. 287
However, a state may restrict rural residents to a single MCO,
PIHP, PAHP, or PCCM if the state permits the beneficiary to
obtain services from any provider if the only plan or provider
available to the beneficiary does not provide the services the
enrollee seeks because of the plan or provider’s religious
objections.288 Medicaid managed care enrollees also must be given
the option to disenroll from a plan that does not, because of
religious objections, cover the services the enrollee seeks. 289 Along
the same lines, state Medicaid agencies “may not require
[Medicaid beneficiaries] to undergo any medical service, diagnosis
or treatment, or to accept any other health service provided under
[a Medicaid] plan if [they] object or, in the case of a child, a parent
or guardian objects on religious grounds.” 290
Religion also plays a role in the ability of Medicare Advantage
(MA) plans, authorized by Medicare Part C, to refuse to cover
services that are objectionable to the plan on religious grounds. As
background, an MA plan is a type of Medicare health plan offered
by a private organization that contracts with Medicare to provide
Medicare beneficiaries with all of their Medicare Part A and Part
B benefits. 291 MA plans include health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), private
287. See id. § 438.52(a) (“Except as [otherwise provided] . . . a State that
requires Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in an MCO, PIHP, PAHP, or PCCM must
give those beneficiaries a choice of at least two entities.”); id. § 438.2 (defining
MCO, PIHP, PAHP, and PCCM).
288. See id. § 438.52(b)(2)(ii)(C) (allowing rural area beneficiaries to obtain
services from another provider if the only provider available does not provide the
care the beneficiary seeks due to the provider’s moral or religious objections).
289. See
id.
§ 438.56(d)(2)(ii)
(“The
following
are
cause
for
disenrollment . . . [t]he plan does not, because of moral or religious objections,
cover the service the enrollee seeks.”).
290. Id. § 440.270(a).
291. Medicare Advantage Plans, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-changeplans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans/medicare-advantageplans.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (explaining the requirements to qualify
for Medicare Parts A and B insurance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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fee-for-service (PFFS) plans, religious fraternal benefit (RFB)
plans, 292 special needs plans (SNPs), and Medicare medical
savings account (MSA) plans. 293
In general, MA plans “may not prohibit or otherwise restrict a
health care professional . . . from advising, or advocating on
behalf of, an [MA enrollee] about the [enrollee’s] health status,
medical care, or treatment options . . . the risks, benefits, and
consequences of treatment or non-treatment; [and] the
opportunity for the enrollee to refuse treatment and to express
preferences about future treatment decisions.”294

However, this general rule does not require an “MA plan to cover,
furnish, or pay for a particular counseling or referral service if the
MA organization that offers the plan objects to the provision of the
service on religious grounds” and makes available information
regarding its coverage policies, including its exclusions, to CMS as
well as to prospective enrollees before and during enrollment. 295
Religion intersects health law in still other ways. Medicare
and Medicaid eligibility, for example, is conditioned on United
States citizenship or qualified alien status. 296 CMS specifies the
documentation that constitutes acceptable evidence of citizenship,
and religious documentation provided by a religious institution

292. Religious fraternal benefit (RFB) societies are nonprofit, tax-exempt
organizations that are “affiliated with, carry out the tenets of, and share a
religious bond with, a church or convention or association of churches or an
affiliated group of churches.” 42 C.F.R. § 422.2 (2017). “An RFB society that offers
an RFB plan may offer that plan only to members of the church or convention or
group of churches with which the society is affiliated.” Id. § 422.57. See generally
id. § 422.524 (establishing special rules for RFB societies).
293. See Health Plans—General Information, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/HealthPlans
GenInfo/index.html?redirect=/HealthPlansGenInfo/12_HIPAA.asp/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (listing the health plan options available to Medicare beneficiaries
under Medicare Part C) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see
also U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICARE MANAGED CARE MANUAL, Chapter 1, at 10, § 30 (Jan. 7, 2011) (listing
the types of MA plans).
294. 42 C.F.R. § 422.206(a).
295. Id. § 422.206(b).
296. See id. §§ 435.406–.407 (limiting Medicaid eligibility to citizens and
certain qualifying aliens; defining citizens as citizens of the United States as well
as non-citizen nationals).
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may be permissible in certain circumstances. 297 An individual who
does not have primary or secondary evidence of citizenship, such
as a United States passport or birth certificate, can present as
evidence a religious record that is recorded with a religious
institution showing that the individual was born in the United
States.298
Religion also impacts the distribution of Medicaid
identification numbers, which can be tied to Social Security
numbers. For example, a state may give a Medicaid identification
number to an applicant who, because of a well-established
religious objection, refuses to obtain a Social Security number. 299
In this context, CMS defines well-established religious objection to
mean “the applicant is a member of a recognized religious sect or
division [thereof, the applicant] adheres to the tenets or teachings
of the sect or division [thereof] and, for these reasons, [the
applicant] is conscientiously opposed to applying for or using a
national identification number.” 300
Religion intersects health law in still other ways. For example,
Medicaid benefits are generally conditioned on an applicant’s proof
of low income and low resources. Countable income does not
include, however, certain payments that certain applicants may
receive as a result of ownership interests in, or usage rights to,
items that have unique religious significance. 301
It is my hope that this Article will encourage constitutional
law and law and religion scholars to produce scholarship
examining these and other topics that lie at the intersection of
297. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (illustrating different ways
religion intersects health law).
298. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.407(c)(3) (2017) (accepting as documentary evidence
of citizenship a “[r]eligious record recorded in the U.S. within 3 months of birth
showing the birth occurred in the U.S. and showing either the date of the birth or
the individual’s age at the time the record was made”).
299. See id. § 435.910(h)(1) (“[A] state may give a Medicaid identification
number to an individual who . . . [r]efuses to obtain an SSN because of
well-established religious objections.”).
300. Id. § 435.910(h)(2)(i)–(ii).
301. See id. § 435.603(e)(3)(5) (excluding from countable income “[p]ayments
resulting from ownership interests in or usage rights to items that have unique
religious, spiritual, traditional, or cultural significance or rights that support
subsistence or a traditional lifestyle according to applicable Tribal Law or
custom”).
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health, law, and religion. Guidance, relevant to the health care
context, on the meanings of “religious contribution,” “religious
documentation provided by a religious organization,”
“well-established religious objection,” and “items that have unique
religious significance” would be extremely helpful for health
industry participants, public health care program beneficiaries,
and practicing health care attorneys. My request for guidance is
especially timely given Neil Gorsuch’s appointment to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s future opinions could impact
the legal meaning of these terms.
I would like to conclude by making three administrative
and/or procedural recommendations that, if implemented, would
improve the counsel provided by regulatory health care attorneys
as well as the public’s understanding of issues that lie at the
intersection of law, religion, and health care finance. My first
administrative recommendation is designed to respond to the
limitations of the federal Administrative Procedure Act’s notice
and comment rulemaking process. When I first started practicing
health law, I subscribed to the HHS listserv and followed a number
of other health law listservs and blogs so that I could stay current
on HHS activity, including proposed rulemakings that could affect
my health industry clients. Now, as a health law teacher, I
continue to subscribe to the HHS listserv and other health
law-related listservs and blogs so that I can keep my teaching and
scholarship up to date. As any health law professor would tell you,
staying current in health law is a full-time job. Time
considerations prevent me from subscribing to the listservs of
other federal agencies and blogs in legal areas outside health law.
For the same reasons, many constitutional law and law and
religion scholars do not subscribe to the HHS listserv or other
health law update services because pure health law (at first glance)
may seem too far afield from the legal issues they teach in the
classroom and the substantive areas in which they write. As an
illustration, I frequently ask constitutional law and law and
religion scholars to opine on recent developments in health law in
which I have interest. Many times the scholars will tell me they
have absolutely no knowledge of the underlying health law
development. That is, the individuals who are best suited to
comment on health laws that implicate religion do not even know
about such laws.
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I have learned that many constitutional law and law and
religion scholars do subscribe to listservs and blogs that consider
on a regular basis constitutional law and law and religion
questions. These blogs include, but certainly are not limited to,
SCOTUSblog,302 Constitutional Law Prof Blog, 303 Constitutional
Daily, 304 The Volokh Conspiracy, 305 Legal Scholarship Blog, 306
Reproductive Rights Prof Blog, 307 The Wall Street Journal’s Law
Blog, 308 Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, 309 Religion Clause, 310
Religion Law Blog, 311 and Law and Religion Forum. 312 Going
forward, I recommend that health law scholars: (1) forward
NPRMs, final rules, and other HHS activity that implicate religion
to the editors of these blogs; (2) highlight, including by page
number within the Federal Register, the religion reference or issue
implicated by the NPRM, final rule, or other development; and
(3) request commentary from individuals who are experts in the
implicated topic. It is my hope that this recommendation will
302. SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
303. Constitutional Law Prof Blog, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
304. Constitution Daily, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://blog.constitutioncenter
.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
305. Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
306. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BLOG, http://www.legalscholarshipblog.com/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. Reproductive Rights Prof Blog, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
308. Business, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
309. Brian Leiter’s L. Sch. Rpts., L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK,
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
310. Religion Clause, BLOGGER, http://religionclause.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
311. Religion Law Blog, BLOGGER, http://religionlaw.blogspot.com/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
312. Law and Religion Forum, ST. JOHN SCH. CTR. L. AND RELIGION,
https://clrforum.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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improve the quantity and quality of constitutional law and law and
religion commentary on health law issues, thereby improving the
development of regulatory health law by HHS, the interpretation
of health law by health care attorneys, and the application of
health law by the health care industry.
Second, many law professors who write in the areas of
constitutional law and law and religion have little exposure to the
ways in which health care is actually delivered and financed. As
such, these academics tend to address in their scholarship and
public speaking opportunities the narrow questions presented in
highly publicized Supreme Court cases, such as Zubik 313 and
Hobby Lobby,314 but not the daily operational questions
encountered by practicing health care attorneys. To remedy this
problem, I recommend that law schools with health law,
constitutional law, and/or law and religion programs host
symposia to which practicing health care attorneys, members of
the clergy, and experts in constitutional law, law and religion, and
religion and spiritual studies are invited. The purpose of these
symposia would be to expose the more theoretical constitutional
law and law and religion scholars to health care operations and to
educate regulatory health care attorneys regarding basic
constitutional principles, frameworks, and guideposts. The
symposia organizers should collect, edit, and publish written
proceedings outlining constitutional law principles applicable to
daily health care operations that may be distributed to health law
scholars and practicing health care attorneys as well as the general
public.
Third, HHS itself should issue guidance for health care
attorneys and the general public addressing the proper
implementation of religious rights, accommodations, and
exceptions in the health care finance context, just as HHS issues
313. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (examining whether
the government could impose taxes or penalties on nonprofit religious employers
who had met the requirements for religious exemption from the contraceptives
coverage mandate of the Affordable Care Act).
314. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014)
(examining “whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . permits
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand
that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage
for . . . contraception . . . violate[s] the sincerely held religious beliefs of the
companies’ owners”).
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guidance on other implementation topics. 315 Parts II, III, and IV of
this Article recommended that HHS issue guidance specific to the
RNHCI, home health care, and hospice contexts, but there are so
many other contexts in which religion intersects health care
finance 316 that could benefit from guidance. HHS already
publishes a wide variety of guidance documents applicable to a
number of different areas within health law,317 and a review of the
content, structure, means of distribution, and Internet
accessibility of these other guidance documents would be helpful
in designing guidance addressing religion and the law governing
health care finance.

315. Cf. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 88, at 133, Rec. 7 (recommending that
the federal government issue guidance to federal employees, service providers,
and the general public stating with clarity the distinction between direct and
indirect forms of government aid to religious institutions and labeling each
program it offers as involving direct or indirect aid).
316. See, e.g., supra notes 278–301 and accompanying text (identifying
additional illustrative ways in which religion intersects health law).
317. See, e.g., supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text (providing three
examples of such guidance documents).

